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Abstract:  
In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in 
a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, 
players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common 
denominator. Subsequently, this group investment is allocated according to a specific rule to 
individual minimum contributions. The game is implemented either as a Single- or a Multi-
Phase Game. In the Single-Phase Game, the contribution schemes are exogenously 
implemented. In the Multi-Phase Game, we let subjects vote on the rule-based contribution 
schemes. If a scheme obtains a sufficient majority it is implemented. In case no sufficient 
majority is reached, subjects have to make their contributions to the public good using the 
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). Our results suggest that the endogenous choice of 
a contribution scheme has an impact on the level of contributions. In case of a rule-based 
contribution scheme which equalizes payoffs, contributions are higher if subjects choose the 
scheme than in case the scheme is implemented exogenously. In contrast, contributions are 
higher if the VCM is implemented exogenously than in case a sufficient majority cannot be 
obtained and, therefore, subjects have to play the VCM. 
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1. Introduction 
Inducing contributions to public goods remains an important endeavor and is particularly 
demanding when sovereign agents have different interests due to heterogeneous preferences. 
Free-riding incentives prevent the voluntary provision of the public good and any institutional 
design which aims at countervailing free riding has to address the question of a fair 
distribution of the costs and benefits of providing public goods. The experimental literature 
suggests rule-based contribution schemes that are inspired by different fairness norms to be 
effective in enhancing cooperation (e.g., Dannenberg et al. 2014, Kesternich et al. 2014a,b, 
Orzen 2008). In such a scheme, agents have to agree upon a common group provision level of 
the public good in combination with a burden sharing rule, i.e., a rule how to share the 
associated costs among the involved parties. All previous papers devoted to this issue assume 
burden sharing rules to be exogenously imposed. We argue that an external implementation is 
not always a feasible or desirable option due to sovereign interests. Furthermore, owing to 
heterogeneous preferences a variety of burden sharing rules appears to be plausible. It is 
therefore an essential challenge for groups of sovereign and heterogeneous agents to 
endogenously determine their institutional framework for the provision of public goods in 
terms of a burden sharing agreement.  
In this paper, we endogenize the decision on how to share the burden in a public goods game 
and explore the performance of different rule-based contribution schemes when sovereign 
agents differ with respect to their initial wealth position. More precisely, we contribute to the 
following research questions: (i) Which burden sharing rule do agents actually prefer; (ii) Are 
sovereign and heterogeneous agents able to agree upon a common burden sharing rule; and 
(iii) Does the endogenous choice of a contribution scheme affect the level of private 
contributions to the public good? 
In our experimental setting, all rule-based contribution schemes are based on the principle of 
the “smallest common denominator” and include two steps: Firstly, all agents can propose a 
minimum group contribution level to the public good. Then, the minimum of all proposals is 
selected and allocated across subjects according to a pre-defined burden sharing rule. This 
approach reflects many real world institutional arrangements for local and global public goods 
that both involve the choice of a provision goal and a burden sharing rule. Referring to 
climate policy, for example, a pre-negotiated rule such as equal carbon reductions among 
countries (Barrett 2003) may be particularly beneficial in reducing negotiation costs when the 
total reduction target changes over time. Since each participating country needs to sign and 
ratify the agreement, the player with the smallest proposal is pivotal. Countries can, however, 
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voluntarily go beyond their obligations.1 In the context of small-scale common-pool 
resources, in contrast, Chambers (1980) and Ostrom (1990) postulate that governing schemes 
which are characterized by equivalent rules for distributing the costs and benefits lead to 
comparatively high cooperation levels. Dayton-Johnson (2000a,b) provides a more rigorous 
theoretical and empirical analysis and concludes that institutions with congruence between the 
distribution of costs and benefits are comparatively successful in managing local commons. 
However, there are different rules how to share the costs and benefits of providing a public 
good and it is a crucial step for the agents to agree upon a common rule how to distribute the 
associated costs and benefits. Thinking of international climate negotiations, for example, a 
variety of pre-negotiated rules for carbon emissions reductions among participating countries 
is conceivable and it is a major challenge for participants to agree upon a common rule 
(Lange et al. 2007,2010, Kesternich et al. 2014c). Preferences for burden sharing rules may be 
inspired by different notions on distributive justice such as accountability, efficiency, need, 
and equality (Johansson-Stenman and Konow 2010). For instance, the need principle requires 
the satisfaction of basic needs such as food, shelter, and clothes and therefore shifts the 
burden towards agents with substantial economic capacities. This approach corresponds to 
Mill’s concept of “equality of sacrifice” (Mill 1848) being initially discussed as a principle for 
tax distribution with the aim of harmonizing payoffs among individuals (ability-to-pay rule). 
In contrast, calls for equal percentage reductions of emissions (sovereignty or grandfathering 
rule) may be rather consistent with a fairness norm which requires equal contributions from 
all agents.  
Our three-player repeated public goods game is implemented either as a Single- or a Multi-
Phase Game. Subjects in the Multi-Phase Game play a collective-choice and a contribution 
phase. In the collective-choice phase, subjects vote upon a common burden sharing rule either 
by majority or unanimity rule voting. The burden sharing rules are inspired by different 
fairness norms and include equal contributions from all group members to the public good 
(eqcont), equal payoffs among all group members (eqpay) and contributions to the public 
good that are proportional to participants’ initial endowment (propcont). If a burden sharing 
rule obtains a sufficient majority it is implemented in the contribution phase. In case no 
sufficient majority is reached, subjects have to make their contributions to the public good 
using the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). In the Single-Phase Game, subjects play 
                                                     
1 First applications of the principle of the smallest common denominator in the context of environmental 
agreements can be found in Endres (1997) and Endres and Finus (1999). 
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only the contribution phase and make their contributions to the public good according to the 
exogenously implemented contribution schemes.  
Our experimental results suggest negotiations upon a common burden sharing agreement to 
significantly affect individual contributions to public goods. Most importantly, in case of a 
scheme aiming at equalizing payoffs, contributions are higher if this allocation rule is 
endogenously implemented. The contrary holds for the VCM. If exogenously implemented, 
contributions are higher in the VCM than in the case where subjects fail to achieve an 
agreement and therefore end up in an uncoordinated action (VCM). Our results confirm 
previous experimental evidence showing different rule-based contribution schemes to be 
effective in increasing contribution levels in public goods games when subjects differ with 
respect to their initial endowment. Endogenously or exogenously implemented, these 
allocation rules counteract typical downward trends in public good provision levels in absence 
of any institutional framework. There is, however, evidence that preferences for different 
allocation rules depend on the individual wealth position within the group. The higher 
subject’s initial endowment, the less (more) frequently they vote for the eqpay (eqcont) 
scheme. Nevertheless, we find subjects to largely recognize the potential efficiency gains of 
the different allocation rules and ending up in a successful burden sharing agreement.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
related literature. Section 3 describes the experimental design and derives our theoretical 
predictions. We present the experimental results in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. A Brief Review of Related Literature 
Two strands of the experimental literature are important for our research questions. Firstly, 
there is vibrant literature on the effect of rule-based contribution schemes on the voluntary 
provision of public goods. In such a contribution scheme, in a first step players agree on a 
common group provision level with the underlying principle of the smallest common 
denominator. In a second step, this group investment is allocated according to a specific 
burden sharing rule to derive individual minimum contributions. Rule-based contribution 
schemes provide an effective way to tackle the public goods’ free-rider problem by 
transforming the social dilemma situation of the VCM into a game with equilibria with 
positive contributions. Orzen (2008) shows rule-based contribution schemes to be effective in 
enhancing cooperation gains in homogeneous public good settings. Dannenberg et al. (2014) 
experimentally study the voluntary formation of coalitions to provide public goods. 
4 
 
Participation and commitment in the coalition are either exogenously imposed or 
endogenously determined by the players themselves. They report participation rates to be 
larger when commitments in the coalition are endogenously determined using a minimum 
contribution rule rather than exogenously determined. While in case of homogeneous groups, 
the only fair burden sharing rule assigns the same burden to all agents. In a heterogeneous 
setting different contribution schemes – inspired by different fairness norms – may seem 
plausible. Kesternich et al. (2014a) find that rule-based contribution schemes lead to 
substantial cooperation gains if agents differ in their benefits from the public good. They 
observe that a burden sharing rule that aims at equalizing payoffs by explicitly addressing 
redistribution among heterogeneous agents payoff-dominates all other burden sharing 
mechanisms. Coordination within the different burden sharing schemes is particularly 
challenging if agents differ with respect to their initial endowments and further experimental 
investigation suggests the perception on various contribution norms to be sensitive to the 
circumstances under which the different positions accrue (Kesternich et al. 2014b).  
In all these experiments, the burden sharing rules are exogenously imposed but an external 
implementation cannot always be considered as a feasible option among sovereign agents nor 
may it be desirable in all cases. This brings us to a further relevant strand of literature: The 
growing number of experiments on the effects of endogenous institutions in social dilemma 
situations. Experimental findings suggest that the endogenous choice of an institutional 
setting has a positive impact on cooperation levels.2 Walker et al. (2000) and Margreiter et al. 
(2005) use a common-pool resource experiment and investigate the effect of jointly 
determined appropriation levels in contrast to independent and individual appropriation 
decisions. In a homogeneous setting, Walker et al. (2000) examine a two-stage game 
consisting of a collective-choice and an individual-contribution stage. In the collective-choice 
stage, each subject can propose appropriation levels for the common-pool resource for each 
group member, followed by the opportunity to vote anonymously on the proposals. If any 
proposal obtains a sufficient majority, the proposal is implemented in the contribution stage of 
the game. In case a majority cannot be obtained, group members make their appropriation 
decision independently. They report participants to be more cooperative in case of a 
                                                     
2 For further experimental evidence see Kosfeld et al. (2009), Ertan et al. (2009), and Hamman et al. (2011). 
Kosfeld et al. (2009) investigate the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision and conclude 
that institutions are formed and that they positively affect cooperation. Ertan et al. (2009) study a repeated public 
goods game in which punishment may be allowed, depending on subjects’ votes. They find an evolution towards 
allowing punishment of low contributions. In Hamman et al. (2011), each group selects an “allocator” at the 
beginning of each round of a repeated public goods game. The allocator then chooses a vector of contributions. 
The result is that the delegation increases the contributions. 
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successfully adopted agreement in contrast to an uncoordinated action. Margreiter et al. 
(2005) extend this mechanism to a setting with heterogeneous agents. Their results show that 
heterogeneity makes it more difficult to achieve an agreement on a proposed appropriation 
level but – again – that the use of the common-pool resource is more efficient if a proposal is 
adopted by voting than if group members decide individually.  
In contrast, our paper focuses on the impact of endogenously implemented institutions in 
contrast to their exogenous implementation and is therefore more closely related to the 
contributions by Sutter et al. (2010) and Balafoutas et al. (2013). Sutter et al. (2010) use a 
public goods game where subjects can decide whether to participate in a voluntary 
contribution mechanism in combination with a rewarding or punishment option or to play a 
standard VCM. They find that the endogenous choice of an institutional setting enhances 
cooperation compared to the situation with exogenously given mechanisms. The study most 
closely related to our experiment is the one by Balafoutas et al. (2013). They investigate the 
effect of endogenously implemented institutional settings with the opportunity to redistribute 
the benefits from investing into a public good across all group members. Each period of the 
experiment consists of two stages: A collective-choice and a contribution stage. In the 
collective-choice stage, participants determine the redistribution factor to be implemented in 
the contribution stage. The redistribution factor allocates the benefits from investing into the 
public good across the group members and varies between equal payoffs for all group 
members and payoffs proportional to subjects’ individual contributions to the public good. 
Subjects specify the value of the redistribution factor they favor at the beginning of each 
period and the median value among all group members is selected by the experimenter and 
implemented in the contribution stage. They find that subjects’ preferences for the 
redistribution factor depend on their initial endowment. Subjects with a high and middle 
initial endowment mostly favor redistribution factors associated with payoffs proportional to 
individual contributions to the public good. In contrast, subjects with a low initial endowment 
prefer redistribution factors associated with equal payoffs from investing into the public good. 
Finally, by comparing exogenously and endogenously implemented redistribution factors 
Balafoutas et al. (2013) find weak evidence that the opportunity to choose the redistribution 
factor by themselves makes subjects more cooperative compared to a situation with the same 
redistribution factor implemented exogenously. Similarly, Dal Bó et al. (2013) show that the 
effect of an institution on the level of cooperation in a prisoner dilemma is larger when the 
appropriate mechanisms are chosen democratically. Furthermore, they report this effect to be 
due to a selection and an endogeneity effect. While players who vote for a certain institution 
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may differ from those who are opposed to it (selection effect), the endogeneity effect 
disentangles potential differences in decision behavior between endogenously or exogenously 
determined settings. 
Contrary to the consistent findings that the democratic implementation of institutions itself 
enhances cooperation in social dilemma situations, Vollan et al. (2013) show that this effect 
depends on the societal norms of subjects. Based on existing findings from western 
democratic countries (Tyran and Feld 2006), they conduct a comparable experiment in China. 
Their public goods game consists of two scenarios: One in which subjects can decide 
democratically over the implementation of a sanctioning mechanism, and one in which the 
contribution schemes are implemented exogenously. In contrast to previous results from 
Tyran and Feld (2006), they find that an endogenously implemented sanctioning mechanism 
decreases cooperation compared to the situation which the mechanism implemented 
exogenously. They argue that these differences can be explained by different societal norms 
with regard to obeying to authorities in China and western democratic countries. 
We extend the existing literature by endogenizing the decision on how to share the burden 
among sovereign and heterogeneous agents in a public goods game and contribute to the 
following research questions: Which rules regarding how to share the benefits and costs from 
providing public goods do agents prefer; whether or not heterogeneous agents are able to 
agree upon a common burden sharing rule; and whether the endogenous choice of a burden 
sharing rule has an impact on the willingness to cooperate. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Theoretical Predictions 
Participants in the Multi-Phase Game play a collective-choice phase and contribution phase. 
In the collective-choice phase, subjects themselves determine the contribution scheme to be 
implemented in the contribution phase. Participants in Single-Phase Game play only the 
contribution phase whereby the different contribution schemes are exogenously given. In the 
Multi-Phase Game, we first test the effect of the endogenous institutional choice by 
comparing contributions to the public good of groups which adopt a contribution scheme with 
contributions from groups which fail to agree upon a scheme. Secondly, we investigate if the 
endogenous choice impacts cooperation levels by comparing the results from the Multi-Phase 
Game with the exogenously implemented counterparts from the Single-Phase Game.3 
 
                                                     
3 Details of the experimental design are summarized in Table A.1. 
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3.1 Single-Phase Game 
In the Single-Phase Game, subjects only play the contribution phase of the experiment. The 
contribution phase contains one of four different allocation rules: Three rule-based 
contribution schemes (eqcont, eqpay and propcont) and the standard voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM).  
The payoff to player 𝑖, 𝜋𝑖, in all contribution schemes is determined by a linear public goods 
game and given by  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 + 𝑏𝑄 
where 𝑒𝑖 marks the initial endowment, 𝑞𝑖 the individual contribution to the public good, 𝑏 the 
marginal per capita return from the public good for player 𝑖 and 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑗𝑛𝑗=1  the aggregated 
provision level. Players differ with respect to their initial endowment. The initial endowment 
as well as contribution levels and payoffs are expressed in LabDollar (LD). Each group of 
three players consists of one “low-type” player (type20) with an initial endowment of 
𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 = 20, one “middle-type” player (type30) with 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 = 30 and one “high-type” 
player (type40) with 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 = 40. Thus, there is a total group endowment of 𝐸 =
∑ 𝑒𝑖 = 90𝑛𝑖=1 . Finally, we assume the marginal benefit from the public good to be 𝑏 = 0.6 and 
the marginal costs for investing into the public good to be equal to one. 
In the baseline VCM, agents simultaneously decide on their individual contributions to the 
public good, 𝑞𝑖. Since their marginal costs from investing into the public good exceed their 
individual benefits, standard theory predicts full free-riding and zero contributions for all 
players and individual payoffs of 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖.  
Our rule-based contribution schemes consist of two stages: In the first stage, the minimum 
stage, all players simultaneously suggest a minimum group provision level 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,90]. 4 
The smallest suggested proposal then determines the lower bound for aggregated 
contributions in the second stage. Therefore, 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑗∈𝑆𝑄𝑗𝑚𝑖𝑛 where 𝑆 is the set of 
players in a group. In the individual contribution stage, the minimum individual contribution 
level, 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛, is derived from the binding group minimum provision level, 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛, according to a 
specific burden sharing rule, i.e., 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛), whereby subjects have to contribute at least the 
minimum contribution level 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛, i.e., 𝑞𝑖 ≥ 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛. Players can, however, go beyond these 
minimum requirements and voluntarily contribute more. We cover three different rule-based 
contribution schemes: 
 
                                                     
4 In our experiment, for 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛  integer multiples of three are required.  
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Equal-Contribution Scheme (eqcont) 
The egalitarian scheme requires equal contribution (eqcont) from all players to the public 
good such that individual minimum contribution levels are for sufficient low group provision 
levels given by 
𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1
𝑛
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
Thus, the binding minimum proposal, 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛, is as far as possible equally distributed across all 
group members. Note that in burden sharing schemes, in the second stage of the contribution 
phase it is obligatory that the desired aggregated provision level 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 is provided by the 
group and that 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0, 𝑒𝑖]. It follows that eqcont may require higher contributions from 
subjects with high endowments if the equal contribution rule would require contributions 
from low-type players that exceed their initial endowment. More formally, contributions of all 
group members are equal and given by 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1𝑛 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 if 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,60]. If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈]60,80] , 
minimum contributions of type20 players are 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 and therefore lower than 
those of type30 and type40 players, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1𝑛−1 �𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20�. If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈]80,90], minimum contributions are given by 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 < 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 <
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1
𝑛−2
�𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 − 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30�.  
In the eqcont scheme, type20 and type30 players have a weakly dominant strategy to suggest 
𝑄𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸. For them the marginal benefit from increasing the groups’ binding minimum 
contribution level exceed its costs for all 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,𝐸]. Choosing 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 𝐸 would either 
reduce their own payoff (i) if they set the binding minimum or (ii) would not change the 
payoff if their minimum proposal is not pivotal. Following this intuition, type40 players have 
a weakly dominant strategy to choose 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 78, since their marginal payoff is positive only 
if 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 80.5 Since the smallest proposal is binding, a subgame perfect equilibrium in 
weakly dominant strategies is characterized by 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 78  with 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 20 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 29 which results in payoffs of 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 = 46.8, 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 = 47.8 and 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 =57.8, given that 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 (see Table A.2, Figure B.1, and Appendix C for the analytical 
solution).  
                                                     
5 Mathematically, the weakly dominant strategy of type40 players is to choose 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 80, but the minimum 
group provision level has to be an integer multiple of three. Therefore, the weakly dominant strategy is to choose 
the greatest integer multiple of three below 80. 
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Equal-Payoff Scheme (eqpay) 
If a rule-based contribution scheme aims at reaching equality in payoffs (eqpay) among all 
group members and if all types of players have different initial endowments but the same 
marginal benefits from the public good, equating 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 = 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 = 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 and solving 
for 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 implies for sufficient high group provision levels that  
𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑖 − 1𝑛 �𝐸 − 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛�. 
Note that in the eqpay scheme, the desired aggregated provision level 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 may not entirely 
allow for payoff equalization since we do not allow for direct redistribution of initial 
endowments between group members and 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0, 𝑒𝑖]. This implies that payoff 
equalization among all group members could be achieved if 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [30,90]. If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 < 30 
payoffs are as far as possible equalized. More formally, if 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈]9,30[, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 and 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑗 − 1𝑛−1 (𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 + 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 − 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛). If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,9], 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. For instance, if 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 24, this scheme would require 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 7 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 17 but nevertheless due to the endowment 
heterogeneity payoff equality is not reached. If 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 individual payoffs are given by 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 = 34.4, 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 = 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 = 37.4. 
In the eqpay scheme, we expect all players to suggest full contribution levels, i.e., 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸 
(see Table A.2, Figure B.1, and Appendix C for the analytical solution). type20 and type30 
players have a weakly dominant strategy to suggest 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸. By anticipating the weakly 
dominant strategy of type20 and type30 players, also type40 players maximize their payoff by 
suggesting 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸. This allocation would lead to individual minimum contribution of 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 and given that 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 equal 
payoffs for all group members of 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 = 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 = 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 = 54.6  
 
Proportional-Contribution Scheme (propcont) 
If a rule-based contribution scheme requires individual contributions to be proportional to 
players’ initial endowment (propcont), individual minimum contribution levels are given by  
𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑖
𝐸
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
                                                     
6 type40 players’ payoff function is not monotonic increasing in 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. Therefore, depending on their beliefs 
about the other players’ proposals, type40 players’ best response is to propose 𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 or 𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸. We 
assume type40 players to anticipate the weakly dominant strategies of their group members and since then their 
payoff is maximized by 𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸, we expect type40 players to propose full contributions. 
10 
 
Thus, the binding minimum proposal, 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛, is distributed across group members according to 
their fraction on the total endowment, that implies, that individual minimum contributions 
increase with players’ initial endowment. In this case, all players have a weakly dominant 
strategy to suggest full contribution levels, i.e., 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸, since their marginal benefit from 
increasing the group’s minimum contribution level exceeds its costs all 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,𝐸]. This 
allocation is a subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies and would lead to 
individual minimum contribution of 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 and given that 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 to payoffs of 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 = 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 = 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 = 54 (see Table 
A.2, Figure B.1, and Appendix C for the analytical solution). 
Thus, assuming that subjects behave according to standard theory and play their minimum 
contribution level, i.e., 𝑞𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛, we can derive the following hypothesis regarding groups’ 
contribution levels 
 
H1: Aggregate Contribution Level to the Public Good 
𝑄𝑒𝑞𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝑄𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 > 𝑄𝑒𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 > 𝑄𝑉𝐶𝑀 = 0. 
 
The theoretical predictions for all rule-based contribution schemes are summarized in Table 
A.2 and graphically illustrated in Figure B.1. 
 
3.2 Multi-Phase Game 
In the first stage of the Multi-Phase Game, the collective-choice phase, subjects anonymously 
vote for one of the proposed rule-based contribution schemes (eqcont, eqpay and propcont). 
We investigate two different voting mechanisms, majority and unanimity rule voting, each 
with three voting rounds. After each voting round, all group members are informed about the 
voting behavior of their group members and whether an agreement is reached. To be adopted, 
a rule-based contribution scheme has to receive 2 out of 3 votes (majority rule voting) or 3 out 
of 3 votes (unanimity rule voting). If the sufficient majority is obtained, the corresponding 
burden sharing rule is implemented thereafter in the contribution phase. If a majority cannot 
be obtained after the third voting round, participants play the VCM.  
According to standard preferences, we expect type20 and type30 players to vote more 
frequently for the eqpay and propcont schemes compared to the eqcont scheme since their 
expected payoffs are comparatively high in those schemes (see Table A.2 and Figure B.1). In 
contrast, for type40 players the expected payoff is the highest in the eqcont scheme. 
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Therefore, we expect type40 players to vote more frequently on the eqcont scheme compared 
to the eqpay and propcont scheme. Since the VCM is expected to be payoff-dominated by all 
rule-based contribution schemes, we expect participants to jointly agree upon a rule-based 
contribution scheme. Furthermore, we expect that an agreement is more easily reached under 
majority than unanimity rule voting and groups to agree more frequently on the eqpay and 
propcont schemes compared to eqcont.  
By relaxing the assumptions of standard preferences and allowing for other-regarding 
preferences, it can be expected that also type40 players vote for the eqpay scheme. One 
prominent theory of other-regarding preferences which in addition allows simple utility 
calculations is the inequality version model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999, F&S). They 
formalize the idea of inequality aversion by adding a disutility from disadvantageous 
inequality (weighted by parameter 𝛼𝑖) and a disutility from advantageous inequality 
(weighted by parameter 𝛽𝑖) to a standard linear utility function. F&S themselves present mean 
values ?̅? = 0.315 and 𝛼� = 0.85 for the inequality aversion parameters which they derive 
from individual behavior in ultimatum games. Blanco et al. (2011) use modified ultimatum 
and dictator games to obtain similar inequality aversion parameters. In their distribution 
(𝑛 = 61), 56% of all subjects can be characterized by 𝛽𝑖 > 0.5 and 33% have 𝛽𝑖 > 0.67. In 
our case, for 𝛽𝑖 > 0.67 a type40 player prefers eqpay to the alternative burden sharing rules. 
For type30 and type40 players with 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0, eqpay at least weakly dominates the 
alternatives.7 Therefore, we can summarize our expectations in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Voting in the Collective-Choice Phase of the Multi-Phase Game 
a) According to standard preferences type20 and type30 participants vote more 
frequently for the eqpay and propcont schemes compared to the eqcont scheme. In 
contrast, type40 players vote more frequently for the eqcont scheme. 
b) Participants agree upon a rule-based contribution scheme. They agree more 
frequently on the eqpay or propcont scheme compared to the eqcont scheme and an 
agreement is more frequently observed under majority compared to unanimity rule 
voting. 
c) By allowing for other-regarding preferences it can be expected that also type40 
players vote more frequently for the eqpay scheme compared to the eqcont and 
propcont schemes. 
 
 
                                                     
7 See Appendix D for a detailed description and a graphical illustration. 
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Furthermore, in our experiment collective-choice itself becomes a treatment variable to 
distinguish whether a contribution scheme is implemented exogenously by the experimenter 
or endogenously by voting of the subjects. To distinguish between exogenously and 
endogenously implemented contribution schemes, we add the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-
eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-propcont) for the exogenous case and the prefix end- (i.e., end-VCM, 
end-eqcont, end-eqpay and end-propcont) for the endogenous case. As standard theory is 
silent regarding the way how the institution has been developed, we do not expect any 
differences in behavior in exogenously and endogenously implemented contribution schemes. 
Thus, we can state the hypothesis: 
 
H3: Endogenous and Exogenous Choice of Contribution Schemes 
𝑄𝑒𝑥−𝑖 = 𝑄𝑒𝑛𝑑−𝑖 whereby 𝑖 = 𝑉𝐶𝑀, 𝑒𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡, 𝑒𝑞𝑝𝑎𝑦,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 
 
Nevertheless, previous studies have shown that the choice of an institutional setting itself may 
have a positive effect on the level of cooperation in social dilemma situations.8 Therefore, we 
have reasonable doubts with respect to the validity of H3 and could expect that the 
opportunity to choose a rule-based contribution scheme by themselves makes subjects more 
cooperative. 
 
3.3 Laboratory Protocol 
The experiment was run in July 2013 at the MaxLab laboratory of the University of 
Magdeburg in Germany. We used ORSEE (Greiner 2004) for recruiting participants and z-
Tree software (Fischbacher 2007) for programming. We recruited 363 students from different 
disciplines. Each student took part in one of 16 sessions with between 21 and 24 subjects. On 
average, a session lasted about 60 minutes. In each session we randomly created up to eight 
groups of three players with different initial endowments, each group consists of one type20, 
type30 and type40 player. Each player remained the same type and in the same group 
throughout the whole experiment (partner matching). During the collective-choice phase, 
subjects received information on players’ type and the outcome of the election within their 
group. During the contribution stage, information on individual contributions to the public 
good, payoffs and corresponding average values within the group was transmitted via screen. 
Participants were not aware of their exact partners and no direct communication between 
participants was allowed.  
                                                     
8 See Section 2 for a brief review of the related literature. 
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At the beginning, participants received a set of experimental instructions which included 
written descriptions, numerical examples, and control questions. Furthermore, participants 
could make use of a simulator on their screen to verify the numerical examples, to answer 
control questions and to simulate different contribution decisions.9 A session of the Single-
Phase Game consists of 12 rounds of the public goods game, the first two being practice 
rounds. Additionally, in the Multi-Phase Game the collective-choice phase with a maximum 
of three voting rounds was added. At the end of each session, one non-practice round of the 
public goods game was randomly chosen to determine individual earnings. The exchange rate 
between Euro and LD was 1:3. On average, participants earned 14.70 Euro. No additional 
show-up fee was paid. 
 
4. Experimental Results 
4.1 Collective-Choice Phase 
We begin our discussion by analyzing participants´ voting behavior in the collective-choice 
phase of the Multi-Phase Game. Our main findings are summarized in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Individually Chosen Rule-Based Contribution Schemes 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 We provide an example of instructions and screenshots in the Appendix E and F. 
Note: Individually chosen rule-based contribution 
scheme in all three rounds of the collective-choice 
phase of the Multi-Phase Game by types. 
Notes: Individually chosen rule-based contribution 
scheme of all players in the collective-choice phase of 
Multi-Phase Game by rounds. Votes: absolute number of 
votes per round. Groups: absolute number of groups 
which successfully coordinate. 
votes 180 117 72 
groups 21 15 10 
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Observation 1: Individually Chosen Rule-Based Contribution Scheme 
The rule-based contribution scheme subjects prefer depends on their initial wealth position in 
the group: The higher their initial endowment, the less (more) frequently they vote for the 
eqpay (eqcont) scheme. The propcont scheme is most frequently chosen by middle endowed 
players. 
 
In line with our theoretical prediction, we find preferences for the different allocation rules to 
depend on subjects’ initial endowment: The frequency players vote for the eqpay scheme is 
decreasing in the initial endowment (p<0.01, Binomial Test, Table A.3). type20 players vote 
in 71% of all cases for the eqpay scheme, type30 players in 46% and type40 players in 20%, 
respectively. Furthermore, type40 players vote more frequently for the eqcont scheme than the 
other group members (type40: 50%, type30: 12%, type20: 9%) (p<0.01, Binomial Test, Table 
A.3). The propcont scheme is most frequently chosen by type30 players (type40: 29%, 
type30: 42%, type20: 20%) (p<0.05, Binomial Test, Table A.3). 
 
Table 1: Implemented Contribution Schemes in the Multi-Phase Game 
 Majority rule voting Unanimity rule voting Total 
VCM 1 
(3.5) 
13 
(41.9) 
14 
(23.3) 
eqcont 3 
(10.3) 
2 
(6.5) 
5 
(8.3) 
eqpay 18 
(62.1) 
10 
(32.3) 
28 
(46.7) 
propcont 7 
(24.1) 
6 
(19.4) 
13 
(21.7) 
Total 29 
(100) 
31 
(100) 
60 
(100) 
Notes: Contribution schemes chosen by a group serves as one observation. Percentage in parentheses.  
 
Observation 2: Implemented Contribution Scheme in the Multi-Phase Game 
The majority of all groups managed to agree upon a common burden sharing rule. 
Furthermore, groups agree more frequently under majority rule voting compared to 
unanimity rule voting and eqpay is the most frequently chosen rule-based contribution 
scheme. 
 
Turning our analysis towards a potential agreement, our experimental data suggest that with 
77% the majority of all groups exploit the potential efficiency gains the rule-based 
contribution schemes offer and agree upon a common burden sharing rule. We find a common 
agreement is more easily obtained under majority (97%) than under unanimity rule voting 
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(58%) (p<0.01, 𝜒2-test and Fisher’s exact test). This could be due to heterogeneous 
preferences among the individual group members. Furthermore, we find that eqpay is the 
most frequently chosen burden sharing rule (p<0.01, Binomial Test, Table A.4). 47% of all 
groups adopt the eqpay scheme to be implemented in the contribution phase. The propcont 
scheme is chosen by 22% of all groups and eqcont by 8% of all groups (see Table 1). 
While at first glance the standard theory of rational and selfish behavior performs quite well 
regarding subjects’ voting behavior, it remains noteworthy, however, that the eqpay scheme 
is, with 62% under majority voting and still with 32% under unanimity voting, the most 
frequently chosen contribution scheme (see Table 1). This observation cannot be explained by 
standard theory. One plausible explanation is that a significant fraction of subjects is 
motivated by other-regarding preferences. In particular, the behavior of type40 players who 
vote for eqpay can be explained very plausibly by inequality aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 
1999). By assuming a sufficiently high level of disutility from advantageous inequality, 
type40 players prefer the eqpay to the eqcont and propcont schemes. Thus, inequality aversion 
may explain the observed voting behavior.10 
 
Observation 3: Chosen Burden Sharing Rule by Rounds 
Almost half of the groups which agree upon a common burden sharing rule already reach an 
agreement in the first voting round. Participants of groups who do not reach consensus in the 
first place change their voting behavior over the rounds: They vote less (more) frequently for 
the eqpay (propcont) scheme.  
 
We find that almost half of all groups (21 groups, 45%) that manage to agree upon a common 
rule-based contribution scheme, already reach consensus in the first round of the collective-
choice phase (see Figure 1). In the second round, further 15 groups agree on an allocation 
scheme and finally, further 10 groups in the last voting round. Next, over the periods, 
participants vote less frequently for the eqpay scheme and more frequently for the propcont 
scheme (p<0.05, Binomial Test, Table A.5). We do not find any significant changes regarding 
the voting behavior on the eqcont scheme. Finally, 14 out of the 60 groups in the Multi-Phase 
Game fail to agree upon a common burden sharing rule. This could be due to divergent 
preferences or, since we do not allow for a direct communication etc., a coordination problem. 
This means that group members are principally willing to agree upon a common rule but fail 
to coordinate. By analyzing group member´s individual voting behavior over the three rounds 
                                                     
10 See Appendix D for a detailed description and a graphical illustration. 
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of the collective-choice phase we conclude that most groups who fail to agree upon a common 
burden sharing rule do so because of the missing willingness to cooperate and to compromise. 
We find that in 11 out of the 14 groups who failed to agree upon a common burden sharing 
rule at least one group member is not willing to give up this initially chosen allocation rule 
over the rounds of the voting stage and insists on the initially chosen burden sharing rule. This 
inflexible position decreases the likelihood of reaching consensus, as this would require that 
the other group members change their voting behavior. 
 
4.2 Contribution Phase 
4.2.1 Contributions to the Public Good 
In this section, we analyze subjects’ contributions to the public good both in the Single- and 
the Multi-Phase Game. Table A.6 reports average group contribution levels for each 
endogenously and exogenously implemented contribution scheme across all periods excluding 
trial periods.11 
At first we investigate average contributions to the public good in the endogenous case. The 
corresponding results are depicted in Figure 2. In line with our theoretical considerations, we 
find contributions to the public good to be higher in case of reaching an agreement upon a 
common distribution rule than in case of no rule is adopted (p<0.10, MW-U test, Table A.7). 
Averaged over all periods and agents, contributions are lowest if subjects could not agree 
upon a common rule-based contribution scheme (8.1) and highest if participants agreed upon 
the eqpay scheme (26.3). Average contributions in the endogenously implemented eqcont and 
propcont schemes are 20.3 and 22.5 respectively (see Table A.6). Our regression results (see 
Table A.13 Model 1) confirm these observations. In Model 1, we only consider observations 
from participants in the Multi-Phase Game and find that the level of contributions to the 
public good is higher if groups adopt a rule-based contribution scheme in the collective-
choice phase. Groups who adopted the eqcont, eqpay or propcont schemes contribute 
significantly more than groups who failed to agree upon a common burden sharing rule and 
therefore have to play the VCM. 
 
 
                                                     
11 We further provide results of nonparametric Mann-Whitney U (MW-U) tests regarding the contributions in 
Table A.7. Results of nonparametric Jonckheere-Terpstra test on time trends in contributions are given in Table 
A.8. Further statistical evidence is given by a series of random effects regression models; see Table A.13. A 
description of all dependent and independent variables entering our regression models is given in Table A.12. 
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Figure 2: Average Contributions per Group in Endogenously and Exogenously 
Implemented Contribution Schemes 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Average group contributions in each period (excluding the trial periods) of the game serve as one 
observation. On the left (right): contributions in the endogenously (exogenously) implemented contribution 
schemes.  
 
Observation 4: Contributions in Endogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
Average contributions are higher in case a rule-based contribution scheme is successfully 
endogenously adopted than in case a sufficient majority is failed and contribution decisions 
are made in the VCM. The downward trend in contributions disappears if a rule-based 
contribution scheme is adopted.  
 
In addition, for eqpay, we find that contributions are higher in case the scheme is 
implemented by unanimity (28.8) in contrast to majority rule voting (24.4) (p<0.10, MW-U 
test, Table A.9 and Figure B.2 left side). All in all, 28 groups choose the eqpay scheme and 
among those 12 groups come to this decision unanimously.12 Noteworthy is that in 12 out of 
the remaining 16 groups, in which the eqpay scheme is implemented by majority, type40 
players are overruled. Focusing on these observations, we find that overruled type40 players 
are comparatively less cooperative (see Figure B.2 right side). type40 players contribute 33.1 
                                                     
12 Note that two groups agreed under majority rule voting per unanimity on the eqpay scheme. 
 
 
 
end-VCM end-eqpay
end-eqcontend-propcont  
 
ex-VCM ex-eqpay
ex-eqcontex-propcont
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if they were overruled in contrast to 37.8 if they voted for eqpay.13 This observation is 
statistically significant for the last period of the contribution phase. Here, overruled type40 
players contribute on average 34.9 and not-overruled type40 players 40.0 (p<0.01, MW-U 
test). 
Finally, we find that the agreement on a common rule-based contribution scheme counteracts 
downward trends in contributions over periods. Contributions of groups, who have to play the 
VCM, decline over the periods (p<0.01, Jonckheere-Terpstra test, Table A.8). In all rule-based 
contribution schemes, there is no evidence for a negative time trend. In the endogenously 
implemented eqpay and propcont schemes, contributions even significantly increase over the 
periods (p<0.1, Jonckheere-Terpstra test, Table A.8). 
In the next paragraph, we turn our analysis towards the different contribution schemes given 
that they are implemented exogenously. 
 
Observation 5: Contributions in Exogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
Given that the contribution schemes are implemented exogenously, the level of cooperation is 
higher in rule-based contribution schemes compared to the VCM. Again, rule-based 
contribution schemes counteract the downward trend in contributions. 
 
Comparable to the results of the Multi-Phase Game we, find that the average contributions are 
higher in rule-based contribution schemes than in the VCM (see Table A.6). Averaged over all 
periods and agents, contributions in the propcont scheme are with 24.3 the highest and 
significantly higher than those in the VCM (17.5) (p<0.05, MW-U test, Table A.7). In the 
eqpay and eqcont schemes average contributions are 21.5 and 21.2, respectively, but not 
statistically significant different from average contributions in the VCM. In our regression 
analysis (see Table A.13 Model 2), we find that the different exogenously implemented 
contribution schemes (eqpay, eqcont and propcont) have a significantly positive impact on 
subjects’ contributions to the public good compared to the exogenous VCM: the eqpay scheme 
at a significance level of 1%, the other two rule-based contribution schemes at the 10%-level. 
Finally, we find that also the exogenously given schemes prevent contributions from 
declining. Given that the VCM is exogenously implemented, average contributions 
significantly decline over periods (p<0.01, Jonckheere-Terpstra test, Table A.8). In contrast, 
there is no evidence that the average contributions decline in the exogenous implemented 
                                                     
13 We could not observe this behavior in the eqcont and propcont scheme. One reason could be the small number 
of groups that agreed in the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game on the eqcont or propcont scheme. 
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rule-based contribution schemes and in the eqcont scheme average contributions increase 
significantly over the periods (p<0.05, Jonckheere-Terpstra test, Table A.8). 
Next, we turn our analysis towards the comparison of contributions to the public good in 
endogenously chosen contribution schemes and their exogenously implemented counterparts.  
 
Observation 6: Contributions in Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented 
Contribution Schemes 
 
a) Considering the eqpay scheme, contributions are higher if this scheme is implemented by 
voting compared to if it is implemented exogenously. 
b) Considering the VCM, subjects who could not manage to agree upon a common rule-
based contribution scheme and, hence, choose to play the VCM contribute less compared 
to participants in the exogenously implemented VCM. 
 
We find that providing the opportunity to reach an agreement by voting has an effect on the 
level of contributions to the public good. If participants manage to agree upon the eqpay 
scheme, contributions are higher compared to the exogenous implemented case (p<0.05, MW-
U test, Table A.7). Averaged over all periods and agents, contributions in the exogenously 
implemented eqpay scheme are 21.5, if, however, the eqpay scheme is implemented 
endogenously average contributions are 26.4 (see Table A.6). In contrast, we find that average 
contributions are lower if participants do not manage to agree upon a common rule-based 
contribution scheme and, therefore, have to play the VCM compared to the situation in which 
the VCM is implemented exogenously (p<0.05, MW-U test, Table A.7). Contributions in the 
exogenously implemented VCM are 17.5 and 8.1 if participants failed to agree upon a 
common rule-based contribution scheme in the voting stage of the experiment (see Table 
A.6). These results are confirmed by our regression results (see Table A.13 Model 3-6). In 
Model 3-6, we only consider observations from the same exogenously or endogenously 
implemented contribution scheme (VCM, eqcont, eqpay and propcont). We find that 
contributions are significantly lower in the endogenously compared to the exogenously 
implemented VCM (see Table A.13 Model 3). In contrast, contributions in the endogenously 
implemented eqpay scheme are significantly higher than in the exogenously implemented 
eqpay scheme (see Table A.13 Model 5). With respect to the eqcont and propcont schemes, 
we cannot find an effect of endogenous choice on the level of contributions to the public 
good. 
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It could be argued that the differences in subjects’ contributions to the public good between 
endogenously and exogenously implemented contribution schemes are driven by a sample 
selection effect à la Dal Bó et al. (2013) and not by an effect of the endogenous choice per 
se.14 By assuming that cooperative subjects are rather willing to give up their initial position 
in the collective-choice phase of the experiment in order to increase the likelihood that their 
group agrees at least on any burden sharing rule in the next voting round, the collective-
choice phase could select cooperative from uncooperative subjects. Therefore, we could 
expect higher contributions in groups that manage to agree upon a common rule-based 
contribution scheme at the end of the collective-choice phase compared to participants that 
ended up in the VCM. We do not deny a possible sample selection effect but following this 
logic a sample selection effect should be relatively weak if groups already agreed in the first 
round of the collective-choice phase on a common allocation rule. By considering only groups 
who agreed already in the first voting round of the collective-choice phase on the eqpay 
scheme we find that the opportunity to vote has still a positive impact on subjects’ 
contributions to the public good (see Figure B.3). Contributions in groups that agree in the 
first voting round on the eqpay scheme are with 25.5 significantly higher than in the 
exogenously implemented eqpay scheme with 21.45 (p<0.01, MW-U test). Following this 
reasoning, we argue that our results are at least partly driven by an effect of the endogenous 
choice and not solely by a sample selection effect. 
4.2.2 Payoffs 
Analyzing participants´ contribution behavior indicates rule-based contribution schemes to be 
effective in increasing contributions to the public good compared to a VCM and that the 
endogenous choice of a contribution scheme does affect the level of contributions. In the 
following, we turn our analysis towards payoff comparisons across the different contribution 
schemes and methods of implementation. Our analysis, thereby, is driven by the question 
whether there exists a contribution scheme which payoff-dominates all other contribution 
schemes. A contribution scheme is payoff-dominant if it is not possible to make any type of 
player better off by choosing another scheme without making at least one player worse off.  
Figure 3 summarizes the average payoffs per group over the periods in all exogenously and 
endogenously implemented contribution schemes.15 
                                                     
14 See Section 2 for a brief review of the related literature. 
15 Table A.6 reports average group payoffs for each endogenously and exogenously implemented contribution 
scheme across all periods excluding trial periods. We further provide results of MW-U tests regarding the 
21 
 
Figure 3: Average Payoffs per Group in Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented 
Contribution Schemes 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Average group payoffs in each period (excluding the trial periods) of the game serve as one observation. 
On the left (right): Payoffs in the endogenously (exogenously) implemented contribution schemes.  
 
As indicated by the contribution behavior, we find compared over all contribution schemes 
and methods of implementation average profits per group are lowest if group members could 
not manage to agree upon a common rule-based contribution scheme in the collective-choice 
phase and therefore have to play the VCM (36.5) and highest if they agree upon the eqpay 
scheme (51.2) (see Table A.6). More precisely, we find that average payoffs per group are 
significantly higher in case one of the three rule-based contribution schemes (eqcont, eqpay or 
propcont) is adopted than in case no scheme gets a sufficient majority (p<0.1, MW-U test, 
Table A.10, Table A.14 Model 1).  
Also in case the contribution schemes are exogenously implemented, payoffs in the rule-based 
contribution schemes (eqpay, eqcont and propcont) are higher than in the VCM (see Table 
A.6) but according to a MW-U test only average profits in the propcont scheme (49.4) are 
significantly different from those in the VCM (44.0) (p<0.05, MW-U test, Table A.10). 
According to the results of our regression analysis (see Table A.14 Model 2), all the rule-
                                                                                                                                                                      
payoffs in Table A.10. Results of nonparametric Jonckheere-Terpstra test on time trends in contributions are 
given in Table A.11. Further statistical evidence is given by a series of random effects regression models; see 
Table A.14. A description of all dependent and independent variables entering our regression models is given in 
Table A.12. 
 
 
end-VCM end-eqpay
end-eqcontend-propcont  
 
ex-VCM ex-eqpay
ex-eqcontex-propcont
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based contribution schemes (eqpay, eqcont and propcont) have a significantly positive impact 
on participants’ payoffs compared to the VCM. 
As indicated by our observations on participants’ contribution behavior we find that the 
opportunity to choose a rule-based contribution scheme in an election has an effect on average 
payoffs. If participants manage to agree upon the eqpay scheme, profits are significantly 
higher compared to the exogenously implemented eqpay scheme (p<0.1, MW-U test, Table 
A.10). In contrast, we find that payoffs are significantly lower if participants did not manage 
to agree upon a common rule-based contribution scheme and therefore have to play the VCM 
compared to the situation in which the VCM is implemented exogenously (p<0.05, MW-U 
test, Table A.10). The results of our regression analysis confirm these observations (see Table 
A.14 Model 3 and 5). 
Observation 7: Individual Payoffs in Exogenously and Endogenously Implemented 
Contribution Schemes 
a) In the exogenous case, the propcont scheme leads to the highest average payoffs per 
group and at least weakly payoff-dominates the other contribution schemes. 
b) In the endogenous case, the eqpay scheme leads to the highest average payoffs per 
group but is not payoff dominant. 
By turning our analysis towards the individual payoffs of the different types of players per 
group we find that among the exogenously implemented contribution schemes the propcont 
scheme at least weakly payoff-dominates all other contribution schemes. Compared to the 
other contribution schemes, type20 and type30 players receive in the propcont scheme their 
highest payoffs with 47.2 and 49.5 respectively. type40 players get the highest payoff in the 
eqcont scheme (53.3) but this is not statistically different from the payoff in the propcont 
scheme (51.6). Therefore, we conclude that among the exogenously implemented contribution 
schemes the propcont is at least weakly payoff-dominant. It is not possible to make any type 
of player better off compared to the propcont scheme without making at least one player 
worse off. 
The situation changes if we turn our analysis towards the endogenously implemented 
contribution schemes. If the contribution schemes are implemented by voting in the 
collective-choice phase of the experiment, the eqpay scheme leads to the highest average 
payoffs but is not payoff-dominant compared to the other contribution schemes. type20 and 
type30 players receive their highest payoffs in the eqpay scheme with 50.3 and 51.3, 
respectively. type40 players get their highest payoff in the eqcont scheme with 52.7 and 
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therefore significantly more than in the endogenously implemented eqpay scheme with 51.5 
(p<0.1, MW-U test).  
4.2.3 Minimum Group Contribution Levels 
While analyzing participants’ contribution behavior and the corresponding payoffs we find 
that rule-based contribution schemes are effective in increasing contributions to the public 
good which leads to higher payoffs and that it makes a difference how the contribution 
schemes are implemented. In case of the eqpay scheme, we find that contributions and 
corresponding payoffs are higher in case the scheme is implemented endogenously compared 
to the exogenously implemented eqpay scheme. 
Considering the latter positive voting effect in more detail we are turning our analysis towards 
the binding minimum group contribution levels (see Figure 4) and the individual proposals for 
the minimum group contribution level. As indicated by participants’ contribution behavior 
and the corresponding payoffs we find that the average binding minimum group contribution 
level is higher in case the eqpay scheme is implemented endogenously (76.6) than in case the 
same scheme is implemented exogenously (61.4) (p<0.1, MW-U test, Table A.15). By 
focusing on groups who failed to coordinate on the full contribution level, we find that type40 
players are in most cases the pivotal group members, i.e., those group members whose 
proposals set the binding minimum group contribution level. Looking at the individual rounds 
of the contribution phase, we find that in 50.6% of the endogenously implemented eqpay 
schemes and in 41.8% of the exogenously implemented eqpay scheme type40 players set the 
binding minimum group contribution level. 
More precisely, we find that independent from the method of implementation type40 players 
make on average the smallest proposals for the binding minimum group contribution level. In 
case the eqpay scheme is chosen in the collective-choice phase they propose on average a 
binding contribution level of 81.2. In case the scheme is implemented exogenously, they 
propose on average 73.9. type30 players propose on average 83.6 in the endogenous and 77.2 
in the exogenous case and type20 players 85.7 and 77.9, respectively. Furthermore, these 
numbers show that all types of players propose on average more for the binding group 
contribution level in case the eqpay scheme is implemented endogenously compared to the 
exogenously implemented eqpay scheme. 
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Figure 4: Average Binding Group Minimum Contribution Levels in Endogenously and 
Exogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
 
 
 
Note: Average binding group minimum contribution levels in each period (excluding the trial periods) of the 
game serve as one observation. On the left (right): Average binding group minimum contribution level in the 
endogenously (exogenously) implemented contribution schemes.  
 
Observation 8: Proposals for the Binding Minimum Group Contribution Level 
a) type40 players propose on average the smallest suggestions for the binding minimum 
group contribution level. 
b) All players propose on average more for the binding minimum group contribution 
level in case the eqpay scheme is implemented endogenously compared to the 
exogenously implemented eqpay scheme. 
c) type40 players have the smallest voluntary contributions beyond the minimum 
individual contribution levels. 
 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this experiment, we investigate whether the endogenous choice of different rules how to 
share the costs of providing a public good affects individual contribution behavior. 
International climate policy might serve as a possible application for this framework. In 
climate negotiations, delegates try to agree upon an overall greenhouse gas reduction target in 
 
 
end-VCM end-eqpay
end-eqcontend-propcont
 
 
ex-VCM ex-eqpay
ex-eqcontex-propcont
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combination with a burden sharing rule for the distribution of the overall reduction target 
among the participating countries. A variety of such rules is conceivable and it is a major 
challenge for the negotiators to agree upon a common rule how to distribute the overall 
burden among the participating countries. Also in the management of local commons, e.g., 
irrigation systems, different rules that govern the distribution of costs and benefits of 
cooperation among group members are subject of discussion. Institutions with congruent rules 
for distributing the costs and benefits lead to comparatively high cooperation levels, but – 
again – a variety of different rules is conceivable and it remains unclear under what 
circumstances which rules evolve.  
Our major finding is that the endogenous choice of a contribution scheme does affect the level 
of contributions to the public good. In case of the eqpay scheme, subjects contribute more to 
the public good if they have selected the scheme themselves instead of a situation where the 
scheme is implemented exogenously by the experimenter. This effect is even stronger if 
groups agree by unanimity compared to majority rule on the eqpay scheme. While we observe 
this positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on contributions to the public good, 
there is also a negative effect. If group members fail to agree upon a rule-based contribution 
scheme in the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game they have to play the VCM. In 
this endogenous case, contributions are lower than in case the VCM is implemented 
exogenously. Therefore, we have to reject our initial research hypothesis H3 stating that there 
is no difference in contributions to the public good between endogenously and exogenously 
implemented contribution schemes. The positive effect of the choice of institutions is, 
nevertheless, in line with the existing literature postulating (weak) evidence for enhancing 
cooperation through voting.  
With respect to the remaining hypotheses derived from standard preferences subjects´ votes in 
the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game are largely predictable by self-interest 
and, therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis H2. Low- and middle-endowed players vote more 
frequently for the eqpay and propcont than for the eqcont scheme. On the other hand, subjects 
with high initial endowment vote more frequently for the eqcont scheme. This observation is 
consistent with the “fairness bias” between the view of an impartial spectator and a 
stakeholder (e.g., Johansson-Stenman and Konow 2010). Empirical studies on the role of 
burden sharing rules among delegates in international climate negotiations confirm tendencies 
of a self-interested use of fairness arguments in international climate policy (Lange et al. 
2007, Lange et al. 2010, Hjerpe et al. 2011). Furthermore, we find groups in most cases to use 
the opportunity to agree upon a common rule-based contribution scheme in the collective-
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choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game. What cannot be explained by standard preferences is 
that the eqpay scheme is under majority and unanimity rule voting the most frequently chosen 
contribution scheme. However, this could be explained by allowing for other-regarding 
preferences, more precisely inequality aversion.  
Regarding the average contribution levels, we cannot reject hypothesis H1. All endogenously 
and exogenously implemented rule-based contribution schemes (eqcont, eqpay and propcont) 
are effective in increasing the level of contributions to the public good. Remarkably, all rule-
based contribution schemes counteract the characteristic downward trend in contributions to 
the public good observed in the VCM – exogenously or endogenously implemented.  
What remains unanswered is that contributions in case the eqpay scheme is chosen by 
unanimity are higher compared to a situation in which the scheme is chosen by majority and 
that contributions are lower in case the VCM is implemented endogenously compared to an 
exogenously implemented VCM. One possible explanation could be that subjects do not want 
to be overruled in the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game and behave 
accordingly uncooperative in case they are. This would explain our findings in the 
endogenously implemented eqpay scheme. Here, overruled type40 players contribute less than 
type40 players who could implement the eqpay scheme as their favored rule-based 
contribution scheme. We conclude that in the by majority implemented eqpay scheme 
overruled type40 players decrease the average contributions to the public good. In the 
endogenously implemented VCM, one could argue that all group members are overruled. No 
one could implement his favored rule-based contribution scheme and behave accordingly 
uncooperative. Nevertheless, the significant low level of contributions to the public good in 
the endogenously implemented VCM could be driven by a sample selection effect induced by 
the collective-choice phase of the Multi-Phase Game. In our experimental design, we cannot 
exclude that the endogenously implemented VCM acts as the collection point for 
uncooperative participants who could not manage to agree upon a common rule-based 
contribution scheme. 
In more general terms, our results show that it may be important how a policy or an 
institutional mechanism is implemented, i.e., whether it is implemented endogenously or 
exogenously. We find that the choice of an institution itself has an effect on cooperation: A 
positive effect exists in case agents are able to agree in an election upon a common 
mechanism whereas a negative effect occurs in case agents have to accept a mechanism they 
have not voted for. From this we conclude, that letting groups of heterogeneous agents choose 
their institutional frameworks for themselves offers both chances and risks, depending on 
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whether agents receive what they voted for or have to accept the decision of others. Of course, 
this implication has to be treated with caution because our experimental design shows at least 
two limitations. Firstly, our design automatically enforces the binding minimum contribution 
levels. Therefore, our design does not take into account that sovereign agents may deviate 
from initially accepted contribution patterns. Secondly, our experiment does not allow us to 
control for individual selection into a specific mechanism. It would be interesting to control 
for possible selection effects in future work by, for example, extending our experimental 
setting according to the design suggested by Dal Bó et al. (2013). Furthermore, one 
potentially fruitful extension would be to relax the assumption that all agents are fully 
informed about the cost and benefits from investing into the public good, i.e., the voting 
procedure could take place behind a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971).  
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Appendix  
Appendix A: Tables 
Table A.1: Experimental Design 
 Treatment Phases No. of Subjects 
(Ind. Obs.) 
Si
ng
le
-P
ha
se
  
G
am
e 
VCM contribution 45 
(15) 
eqpay contribution 45 
(15) 
eqcont contribution 48 
(46) 
propcont contribution 48 
(12) 
M
ul
ti-
Ph
as
e 
G
am
e majority collective-choice and contribution 
87 
(29) 
unanimity collective-choice 
and contribution 
93 
(31) 
Notes: Players participate in groups of 3 in a repeated public goods game with overall 10 
periods (excluding trial periods) and a marginal per capita return from investing into the 
public good of 0.6. Each group consists of one player with an initial endowment of 20, 
30, and 40 LD. In the collective-choice phase, subjects vote for the proposed rule-based 
contribution schemes (eqcont, eqpay and propcont). To be adopted, a rule-based 
contribution scheme must receive 2 out of 3 votes (majority rule) and 3 out of 3 votes 
(unanimity rule). If a rule-based contribution scheme is adopted it is implemented in the 
contribution phase. If no rule-based contribution scheme is adopted a VCM is 
implemented in the contribution phase. 
 
Table A.2: Theoretical Predictions according to Standard Preferences 
 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 Π 
VCM 0 0 0 0 20 30 40 90 
eqcont 78 20 29 29 46.8 47.8 57.8 152.4 
eqpay 90 20 30 40 54 54 54 162 
propcont 90 20 30 40 54 54 54 162 
Notes: 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = binding minimum group contribution level; 𝑞𝑖 = individual contribution of player 𝑖 to the 
public good; 𝜋𝑖 = individual payoff of player 𝑖; Π = group payoff.  
 
Table A.3: Test Between Types (Binomial Test): Individually Chosen Rule-Bases 
Contribution Schemes 
 eqcont eqpay propcont 
 type20 type30 type20 type30 type20 type30 
type30 >  <***  >***  
type40 >*** >*** <*** <*** > <** 
Notes: Votes in all three voting rounds for a rule-based contribution scheme serve as one observation. We 
compare rows with columns, *p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. Example: type40 players vote less frequently for 
the eqpay scheme compared to type20 players, this difference is significant at the 1%-level. 
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Table A.4: Implemented Contribution Schemes in the Multi-Phase Game (Binomial 
Test) 
 VCM eqpay eqcont 
eqpay >***   
eqcont <*** <***  
propcont > <*** >*** 
Notes: Contribution schemes chosen 
by a group serves as one observation. 
We compare rows with columns, 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. 
Example: eqpay is more frequently 
implemented compared to eqcont, 
this difference is significant at the 
1%-level. 
 
Table A.5: Test Between Rounds (Binomial Test): Chosen Rule-Based Contribution 
Schemes 
  Round 1 Round 3 
  eqcont eqpay Propcont eqcont eqpay propcont 
Ro
un
d 
2 
eqcont <   >   
eqpay  <   >***  
propcont   >**   <*** 
Ro
un
d 
3 
eqcont <      
eqpay  <***     
propcont   >***    
Notes: Votes in each of the three voting rounds for a rule-based contribution scheme serve as one observation. 
We compare rows with columns, *p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. Example: participants vote less frequently 
for the eqpay scheme in the third voting round compared to the first voting round, this difference is significant at 
the 5%-level. 
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Table A.6: Summary Statistic of all Contribution Schemes: Average Contributions and 
Payoffs per Group in Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented Contribution 
Schemes 
 ex-
VCM 
end-
VCM 
ex-
eqcont 
end-
eqcont 
ex- 
eqpay 
end- 
eqpay 
ex- 
propcont 
end- 
propcont 
All Periods 
𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙  17.45 8.14 21.20 20.33 21.45 26.32 24.29 22.48 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 13.13 6.74 16.73 15.74 13.6 17.07 16.58 15.27 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 17.75 10.20 21.91 21.35 21.31 26.04 24.21 22.49 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 21.46 7.49 24.96 23.89 29.45 35.84 32.09 29.68 
𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙  43.96 36.51 46.96 46.26 47.16 51.05 49.43 47.99 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 32.27 27.91 41.44 40.85 45.02 50.30 47.15 45.19 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 43.65 34.46 46.25 45.24 47.30 51.33 49.52 47.97 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 49.95 47.17 53.20 52.70 49.17 51.53 51.63 50.79 
Last Five Periods 
𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙  15.58 6.63 22.14 20.91 21.61 27.27 24.43 23.70 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 11.64 5.75 17.30 15.83 14.16 17.70 16.74 15.82 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 16.06 8.37 23.33 22.18 21.32 26.93 24.38 23.74 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 19.04 5.77 25.81 24.72 29.36 37.18 32.19 31.54 
𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙  42.47 35.30 47.72 46.73 47.29 51.82 49.55 48.96 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 36.40 26.19 42.56 41.81 44.74 51.39 47.24 46.84 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 41.99 33.57 46.53 45.46 47.58 52.16 49.60 48.92 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 49.00 46.16 54.05 52.92 49.54 51.90 51.79 51.12 
Last Period 
𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙  8.91 2.98 23.29 21.60 21.00 27.64 24.38 26.27 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 7.67 2.21 18.33 16.00 14.67 18.32 17.45 17.54 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 10.73 6.00 24.47 23.40 20.33 26.79 23.81 26.31 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 8.33 0.71 27.07 25.40 28.00 37.82 31.86 34.98 
𝜋𝑎𝑙𝑙  37.13 32.38 48.63 47.28 46.80 52.11 49.50 51.02 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 28.37 23.14 43.59 42.88 43.13 51.44 46.42 49.76 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 35.31 29.36 47.45 45.48 47.47 52.97 50.06 50.98 
𝜋𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 47.71 44.64 54.85 53.48 49.80 51.94 52.02 52.32 
Notes: 𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙 = average contributions per group over all 10 periods (excluding trial periods), the last five periods 
and in the last period; 𝑞𝑖 = individual contribution of player 𝑖; 𝜋 = average profits per group over all 10 periods 
(excluding trial periods), the last five periods and in the last period; 𝜋𝑖 = individual payoff of player 𝑖. 
Exogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-
propcont), endogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix end- (i.e., end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-
eqpay and end-propcont).  
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Table A.7: Tests Between Treatments (MW-U test): Average Contributions per Group 
in Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
Treatment ex- 
VCM 
end- 
VCM 
ex- 
eqcont 
end-
eqcont 
ex- 
eqpay 
end- 
eqpay 
ex- 
propcont 
All Periods 
  end-VCM <**       
  ex-eqcont >       
  end-eqcont  >* <     
  ex-eqpay >  >     
  end-eqpay  >***  > >**   
  ex-propcont >**  >**  >   
  end-propcont  >***  >  < < 
Last Five Periods 
  end-VCM <**       
  ex-eqcont >       
  end-eqcont  >** <     
  ex-eqpay >**  <     
  end-eqpay  >***  >* >*   
  ex-propcont >***  >**  >   
  end-propcont  >***  >  < < 
Last Period 
  end-VCM <**       
  ex-eqcont >***       
  end-eqcont  >** <     
  ex-eqpay >***  <     
  end-eqpay  >***  >** >*   
  ex-propcont >***  >*  >   
  end-propcont  >**  >  < > 
Notes: Average contributions per group serve as one observation. We compare rows with columns, e.g., over all 
10 periods (excluding trial periods), the last five periods and in the last period; *p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. 
Exogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-
propcont), endogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix end- (i.e., end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-
eqpay and end-propcont). Example: averaged over all periods contributions in ex-propcont are higher than in ex-
VCM, this difference is significant at the 5%-level. 
 
  
34 
 
Table A.8: Time Trends in all Contribution Schemes: Average Contributions per Group 
in Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
Treatment ex-
VCM 
end-
VCM 
ex- 
eqcont 
end-
eqcont 
ex- 
eqpay 
end- 
eqpay 
ex- 
propcont 
end-
propcont 
All players ▼*** ▼*** *   ***  * 
Note: Average contributions per group in each period (excluding the trial periods) of the game serves as one 
observation. Statistical results for time trends are based on the Jonckheere–Terpstra test. ▼:= decreasing 
contributions over periods, := increasing contributions over periods;* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Exogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-
propcont), endogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix end- (i.e., end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-
eqpay and end-propcont). 
 
Table A.9: Summary Statistic of endogenously eqpay Scheme: Average Contributions 
per Group in the by Unanimity and Majority Implemented eqpay Scheme 
 end-eqpay 
 all unanimity majority 
𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑙  26.32 28.84 24.43 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 17.07 18.87 15.73 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 26.04 28.85 23.93 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 35.84 38.79 33.62 
Notes: 𝑞 = average contributions per group 
over all 10 periods (excluding trial periods).  
 
 
35 
 
Table A.10: Tests Between Treatments (MW-U test): Average Payoffs per Group in 
Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
 ex- 
VCM 
end- 
VCM 
ex- 
eqcont 
end-
eqcont 
ex- 
eqpay 
end- 
eqpay 
ex- 
propcont 
All Periods 
  end-VCM <**       
  ex-eqcont >       
  end-eqcont  >* <     
  ex-eqpay >  >     
  end-eqpay  >***  > >**   
  ex-propcont >**  >**  >   
  end-propcont  >***  >  < < 
Last Five Periods 
  end-VCM <**       
  ex-eqcont >       
  end-eqcont  >** <     
  ex-eqpay >**  <     
  end-eqpay  >***  >* >*   
  ex-propcont >***  >**  >   
  end-propcont  >***  >  < < 
Last Period 
  end-VCM <**       
  ex-eqcont >***       
  end-eqcont  >** <     
  ex-eqpay >***  <     
  end-eqpay  >***  >** >*   
  ex-propcont >***  >*  >   
  end-propcont  >***  >  < > 
Notes: Average payoffs per group serve as one observation. We compare rows with columns, e.g., over all 10 
periods (excluding trial periods), the last five periods and in the last period; *p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. 
Exogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-
propcont), endogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix end- (i.e., end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-
eqpay and end-propcont). Example: averaged over all periods profits in ex-eqpay are higher than in ex-VCM, this 
difference is not significant at a conventional level. 
 
 
Table A.11: Time Trends in all Contribution Schemes: Average Payoffs per Group in 
Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
Treatment ex- 
VCM 
end-
VCM 
ex-
eqcont 
end-
eqcont 
ex-
eqpay 
end-
eqpay 
ex-
propcont 
end- 
propcont 
All players ▼*** ▼*** *   ***   
Note: Average contributions in each period (excluding the trial periods) of the game serves as one observation. 
Statistical results for time trends are based on the Jonckheere–Terpstra test. ▼:= decreasing contributions over 
periods, := increasing contributions over periods;* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Exogenously implemented 
contribution schemes get the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-propcont), endogenously 
implemented contribution schemes get the prefix end- (i.e., end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-eqpay and end-propcont). 
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Table A.12: Definition of Variables 
Variable Description 
qi Individual contribution of subject i to the public good 
πi Subject i’s profit  
eqcont = 1 if subject i played eqcont, 0 else  
eqpay = 1 if subject i played eqpay, 0 else 
propcont = 1 if subject i played propcont, 0 else 
voting = 1 if subject i played the Multi-Phase Game, 0 else 
male = 1 if subject i is male, 0 if female 
exp Number of experiments subject i has taken part in MaXLab 
 
Estimation Strategy 
A series of random-effects regression models is used in order to determine individuals’ 
contributions behavior and the corresponding payoffs. We consider individual level random 
effects, i.e., one observation of one individual corresponds to the panel variable and the period 
sets the time variable. All in all we have 3,630 observations in our econometric analysis. Due 
to missing sociodemographic information we have to remove three out of the 366 participants 
from our economic analysis. From the remaining 363 subjects we have one observation for 
each of the 10 payoff relevant periods. The discussion of the regression results is based on 
standard errors computed at individual levels. 
For both, contributions to the public good and the corresponding payoffs, we use six different 
regression models. The first model considers only observations from Multi-Phase Game, the 
endogenously implemented contribution schemes (end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-eqpay and end-
propcont). In contrast, the second model only considers observations form the Single-Phase 
Game, the exogenously implemented contribution scheme (ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay and 
ex-propcont). The remaining four regression models consider only observations from one 
contribution scheme (VCM, eqcont, eqpay and propcont), endogenously or exogenously 
implemented. 
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Table A.13: FGLS Random-Effects Regression of Contributions per Subject in 
Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
𝑞𝑖 𝑞𝑖 𝑞𝑖 𝑞𝑖 𝑞𝑖 𝑞𝑖 
Contribution 
Scheme all all VCM eqcont eqpay propcont 
Implementation endogenously exogenously 
endogenously 
and 
exogenously 
endogenously 
and 
exogenously 
endogenously 
and 
exogenously 
endogenously 
and 
exogenously 
Independent 
Variables↓  
     
       
eqpay 17.92*** 
(1.66) 
4.29* 
(2.38) 
    
       
eqcont 11.79*** 
(3.17) 
4.05* 
(2.12) 
    
       
propcont 14.23*** 
(2.15) 
6.92*** 
(2.31) 
    
       
voting   -9.38*** 
(2.14) 
-1.19 
(2.88) 
4.63** 
(1.98) 
-1.85 
(2.30) 
       
male 1.44 
(1.54) 
2.42 
(1.52) 
1.16 
(2.20) 
4.82** 
(2.15) 
0.12 
(1.89) 
3.63 
(2.32) 
       
exp -0.02 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.28** 
(0.13) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
       
Constant 7.67*** 
(1.64) 
14.94*** 
(2.28) 
15.58*** 
(2.56) 
21.51*** 
(1.93) 
20.72*** 
(2.13) 
21.02*** 
(2.18) 
       
Observations 1.800 1.830 870 600 1.290 870 
Number of 
Individuals 180 183 87 60 129 87 
Notes: 𝑞𝑖 = Individual contribution of subject i to the public good in each period (excluding the trial periods). 
Standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. Model 1 considers observations from all 
endogenously implemented contribution schemes (end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-eqpay, and end-propcont). Model 2 
considers all observations from exogenously implemented contribution schemes (ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay, and 
ex-propcont). Model 3 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously implemented VCM (end-
VCM and ex-VCM). Model 4 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously implemented eqcont 
(end-eqcont and ex-eqcont). Model 5 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously implemented 
eqpay (end-eqpay and ex-eqpay). Model 6 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously 
implemented propcont (end-propcont and ex-propcont). 
. 
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Table A.14: FGLS Random-Effects Regression of Payoffs per Subject in Endogenously 
and Exogenously Implemented Contribution Schemes 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
𝜋𝑖 𝜋𝑖 𝜋𝑖 𝜋𝑖 𝜋𝑖 𝜋𝑖 
Contribution 
Scheme all all VCM eqcont eqpay propcont 
Implementation endogenously exogenously 
endogenously 
and 
exogenously 
endogenously 
and 
exogenously 
endogenously 
and 
exogenously 
endogenously 
and 
exogenously 
Independent  
Variables↓ 
       
eqpay 14.11*** 
(1.72) 
3.51* 
(1.90) 
    
       
eqcont 9.16*** 
(3.03) 
3.28* 
(1.93) 
    
       
propcont 11.27*** 
(2.07) 
5.53*** 
(1.88) 
    
       
voting   -7.33*** 
(2.27) 
-1.71 
(2.76) 
3.44*** 
(1.17) 
-1.48 
(1.63) 
       
male 2.24* 
(1.28) 
1.91 
(1.21) 
0.39 
(2.30) 
3.99* 
(2.22) 
1.66 
(1.08) 
2.74 
(1.67) 
       
exp -0.04 
(0.09) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.12) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
       
Constant 36.02*** 
(1.85) 
41.64*** 
(1.88) 
44.38*** 
(2.35) 
45.12*** 
(2.02) 
45.38*** 
(1.44) 
47.04*** 
(1.81) 
       
Observations 1.800 1.830 870 600 1290 870 
Number of 
Groups 180 183 87 60 129 87 
Notes: 𝑞𝑖 = Individual profit of subject i in each period (excluding the trial periods). Standard errors in 
parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. Model 1 considers observations from all endogenously 
implemented contribution schemes (end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-eqpay, and end-propcont). Model 2 considers all 
observations from exogenously implemented contribution schemes (ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay, and ex-
propcont). Model 3 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously implemented VCM (end-
VCM and ex-VCM). Model 4 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously implemented 
eqcont (end-eqcont and ex-eqcont). Model 5 considers observations from the endogenously and exogenously 
implemented eqpay (end-eqpay and ex-eqpay). Model 6 considers observations from the endogenously and 
exogenously implemented propcont (end-propcont and ex-propcont). 
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Table A.15: Summary Statistic of all Contribution Schemes: Average Binding Group 
Minimum Contribution Level in Endogenously and Exogenously Implemented Rule-
Bases Contribution Schemes 
 ex- 
eqcont 
end- 
eqcont 
ex- 
eqpay 
end- 
eqpay 
ex- 
propcont 
end- 
propcont 
All Periods 
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 61.14 60.66 61.44 76.55 69.51 66.67 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝑚𝑖𝑛  16.57 15.46 12.03 16.04 15.45 14.82 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝑚𝑖𝑛  21.25 21.31 20.31 25.39 23.17 22.22 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝑚𝑖𝑛  23.32 23.89 29.10 35.12 30.89 29.63 
Last Five Periods 
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 64.5 62.20 63.30 79.98 70.50 70.85 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝑚𝑖𝑛  17.24 15.37 13.12 17.06 15.67 15.74 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝑚𝑖𝑛  22.57 22.12 20.89 26.55 23.50 23.62 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝑚𝑖𝑛  24.68 24.71 29.29 36.38 31.33 33.49 
Last Period 
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 68.80 64.80 61.20 80.57 69.94 78.69 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝑚𝑖𝑛  18.33 16.00 13.00 17.43 15.54 17.48 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝑚𝑖𝑛  24.47 23.40 20.33 26.75 23.31 26.23 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝑚𝑖𝑛  26.00 25.40 27.87 36.39 31.08 34.98 
Notes: 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = binding minimum group contribution level. 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛= binding individual contribution level. In all 10 
periods (excluding trial periods), the last five periods and in the last period. Exogenously implemented 
contribution schemes get the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-propcont), endogenously 
implemented contribution schemes get the prefix end- (i.e., end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-eqpay and end-propcont).  
 
  
Table A.16: Tests Between Treatments (MW-U test): Average Minimum Group 
Contribution Levels 
 ex- 
eqcont 
end- 
eqcont 
ex- 
eqpay 
end- 
eqpay 
ex- 
propcont 
All Periods      
  end-eqcont <     
  ex-eqpay >     
  end-eqpay  >** >***   
  ex-propcont >***  >*   
  end-propcont  >  < < 
Last Five Periods 
  end-eqcont <     
  ex-eqpay <     
  end-eqpay  >* >   
  ex-propcont >*  >   
  end-propcont  >  < > 
Last Period      
  end-eqcont <     
  ex-eqpay <     
  end-eqpay  >** >   
  ex-propcont >  >   
  end-propcont  >  < > 
Notes: Average binding minimum group contributions serve as one observation. We compare rows with 
columns, e.g., over all 10 periods (excluding trial periods), the last five periods and in the last period; *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. Exogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix ex- (i.e., ex-VCM, ex-
eqcont, ex-eqpay and ex-propcont), endogenously implemented contribution schemes get the prefix end- (i.e., 
end-VCM, end-eqcont, end-eqpay and end-propcont). Example: averaged over all periods binding minimum 
group contributions in ex-propcont are higher than in ex-eqpay, this difference is significant at the 10%-level. 
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Appendix B: Figures 
Figure B.1: Theoretical Predictions according to Standard Preferences 
 
 
 
 
  
 
type40
type30
type20
Notes: Binding minimum group contribution levels on the x-axis and corresponding payoffs for each player 
per group on the y-axis. Dotted lines indicate type-specific equilibrium quantities and corresponding 
payoffs. 
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Figure B.2: Average Contributions per Group in Endogenously Implemented eqpay 
Schemes 
  
Notes: Average group contributions in each period   Notes: Mean contributions of overruled and not 
(excluding the trial periods) of the endogenously eqpay  overruled type40 players. Average contributions 
scheme serves as one observation.    in each period (excluding the trial periods) of the 
       by majority implemented eqpay scheme serves 
       as one observation.  
 
 
Figure B.3: Average Contributions per Group in the eqpay Scheme Implemented by 
Voting in 1st Round or Exogenously 
 
Notes: Average group contributions in each period (excluding the trial periods) of the eqpay scheme serves as 
one observation. 
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Appendix C: Theoretical Predictions 
Analytical Solution according to Standard Preferences 
Equal-Contribution Scheme (eqcont) 
In the eqcont scheme a subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies is 
characterized by 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 78, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1𝑛−1 �78 − 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20�.  
type20 and type30 players have a weakly dominant strategy to propose 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸 because 
their marginal payoff from increasing the groups’ binding minimum contribution level is 
positive for all 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,𝐸]. In case their proposal is binding, increasing the minimum 
contribution until 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸 would increase their payoff. In case their proposal is not binding, 
proposing 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸 would not hurt them. Following this logic type40 players have a weakly 
dominant strategy to propose 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 78, because their payoff is maximized for 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 78. 
Since the smallest proposal is binding the subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly dominant 
strategies given by 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 78. 
Since it is obligatory that 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 is provided and 𝑞𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑒𝑖] payoff functions are discontinuous 
and separated in three parts: 
Part 1: If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,60], players’ minimum individual contribution levels are given by 
𝑞𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1
𝑛
𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 and individual payoff is given by  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 1𝑛 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑏𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
Therefore, players’ marginal payoff form increasing the groups’ binding minimum 
contribution level is given by 𝜕𝜋 𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= − 1
𝑛
+ 𝑏 = −1
3
+ 3
5
= 4
15
> 0 and the marginal benefits 
exceeding its costs.  
Part 2: If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈]60,80], 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1𝑛−1 (𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20). 
Therefore, type20 players’ marginal payoff is given by 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝑏 = 3
5
> 0 and for type30 
as well as type40 given by 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= − 1
𝑛−1
+ 𝑏 = −1
2
+ 3
5
= 1
10
> 0.  
Part 3: If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈]80,90], 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 1𝑛−2 �𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 −
𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20 − 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30�. Therefore type20 and type30 players’ marginal payoff is given by 
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𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝑏 = 3
5
> 0 and for type40 players’ given by 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= − 1
𝑛−2
+ 𝑏 = 
−1 + 6
10
= −2
5
< 0. 
Equal-Payoff Scheme (eqpay) 
In the eqpay scheme, we expect all players to suggest full contribution levels, i.e., 𝑄𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸. 
type20 and type30 players have a weakly dominant strategy to propose 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸 and by 
anticipating that also type40 players have an incentive to suggest 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸. Therefore we 
expect the groups’ binding minimum contribution level to be 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸, which implies 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40.  
Since we do not allow for direct redistribution of initial endowment and 𝑞𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑒𝑖] payoff 
functions are discontinuous and separated in three parts.  
Part 1: If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [30,90] individual minimum contributions are given by 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑖 −
1
𝑛
�𝐸 − 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛� and individual payoffs are  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − (𝑒𝑖 − 1𝑛 �𝐸 − 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛�) + 𝑏𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
Therefore, the marginal benefits form increasing the groups’ minimum contribution level 
exceeds its costs for all players and the marginal payoff is given by 𝜕𝜋 𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= − 1
𝑛
+ 𝑏 = 
−
1
3
+ 3
5
= 4
15
> 0. 
Part 2: If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈]9,30[ individual minimum contributions are 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑗 − 1𝑛−1 �𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40 + 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 − 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛�. Therefore, the marginal payoff for type20 
players is given by 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝑏 = 6
10
> 0, and for type30 as well type40 it is given by 
𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= − 1
𝑛−1
+ 𝑏 = −1
2
+ 3
5
= 1
10
> 0. 
Part 3: If 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,9] individual minimum contributions are 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0 and 
𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. Therefore, marginal payoffs for type20 and type30 players are given by 
𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= 𝑏 = 3
5
> 0 and 𝜕𝜋 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= −1 + 𝑏 = −1 + 3
5
= −2
5
< 0 for type40 
players.  
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Proportional-Contribution Scheme (propcont) 
In the propcont scheme a subgame perfect equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies is 
characterized by 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸 = 90, and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒20, 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒30 and 𝑞𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒40.  
For all players, the benefits from increasing the binding group minimum contribution level 
exceeds its costs for all 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,𝐸] and it is the weakly dominant strategy for all players to 
propose 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸.  
For all 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,𝐸] the binding individual contribution level is given by 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑒𝑖𝐸 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 
individual payoffs are given by  
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖𝐸 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑏𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛. 
Therefore for all players the marginal benefits from increasing the groups’ binding minimum 
contribution level exceeds its costs and the marginal payoffs are given by 𝜕𝜋 𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛
= − 𝑒𝑖
𝐸
+ 𝑏 = 
−
2
9
+ 3
5
= 17
45
> 0 for type20 players, −1
3
+ 3
5
= 4
15
> 0 for type30 players and −4
9
+ 3
5
= 7
45
>0 for type40 players.  
  
45 
 
Appendix D: Voting Behaviour and Other Regarding Preferences 
F&S introduce the idea that actors may be averse to inequality. They formalise the idea of 
inequality aversion by introducing the following utility for player 𝑖, given the payoffs for all 
other players 𝑗: 
𝑈𝑖�𝜋𝑖 ,𝜋𝑗� = 𝜋𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑁−1∑ max�𝜋𝑗 − 𝜋𝑖 , 0� − 𝛽𝑖𝑁−1∑ max�𝜋𝑖 − 𝜋𝑗 , 0�𝑁𝑗≠𝑖𝑁𝑗≠𝑖 . 
For 𝛼𝑖,𝛽𝑖 > 0, this implies that player 𝑖 derives disutility from inequality. The second term in 
the utility function represents disutility from disadvantageous inequality (in case of 𝜋𝑗 > 𝜋𝑖, 
weighted by 𝛼𝑖), while the third term reflects disutility from advantageous inequality (in case 
of 𝜋𝑖 > 𝜋𝑗 , weighted by 𝛽𝑖). F&S assume 𝛽𝑖 < 1 and 𝛼𝑖 ≥ 𝛽𝑖. 
By assuming that participants prefer the burden sharing rule which leads at least at one 
minimum group contribution level 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,90] to a strict higher expected payoff in 
comparison to the other rules, the preference order for the different types of players with 
standard preferences is as follows:  
 
type20: 𝜋𝑖,𝑒𝑞𝑝𝑎𝑦 > 𝜋𝑖,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 > 𝜋𝑖,𝑒𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 
type30: 𝜋𝑖,𝑒𝑞𝑝𝑎𝑦 > 𝜋𝑖,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 > 𝜋𝑖,𝑒𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 
type40: 𝜋𝑖,𝑒𝑞𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 > 𝜋𝑖,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 > 𝜋𝑖,𝑒𝑞𝑝𝑎𝑦. 
 
Assuming standard preferences, type20 and type30 players would, thus, vote for eqpay and 
type40 players for eqcont. These are the predictions we derived in Section 3.2 although here 
we relaxed the assumption that participants take only equilibrium minimum contribution 
levels into account and assume that all possible minimum contribution levels 𝑄𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ [0,90] 
are considered. Figure D.1 shows in the upper section the expected payoffs for the different 
types of players in the different burden sharing rules and illustrates the voting behaviour. 
This pictures changes if we allow for inequality aversion and compare F&S utility values. In 
particular, if we assume 𝛽𝑖 = 0.67, type40 players are indifferent between eqpay and the other 
schemes, and both other types strictly prefer eqpay. For values 𝛽𝑖 > 0.67, all types of players 
strictly prefer eqpay. This holds independent from the value for 𝛼𝑖. Figure D.1 shows in the 
lower section the utility values for the different types of players in the different burden 
sharing rules by assuming a F&S utility function with 𝛽𝑖 = 0.8 and 𝛼𝑖 = 0. 
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Figure D.1: Voting Behavior According to Standard Preferences and Other-Regarding 
Preferences  
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Appendix E: Instructions 
Multi-Phase Game 
Please read the instructions carefully and contact us by opening the door or giving a hand signal if you have 
any questions. Please do not talk to each other and do not use any electronic devices such as mobile phones, 
smart phones, or the like throughout the whole experiment. In the experiment you are now taking part in, 
you can earn money depending on your decisions and those of your teammates. Your payoff from the 
experiment is calculated in LaborDollars (LD) and the exchange rate between € and LD is 1:3, i.e., 3 LD 
equals 1 €. 
During the experiment, you make your decisions anonymously. Only the experimenter will know your 
identity and your data will be treated confidentially. This experiment consists of two parts that will be 
carried out consecutively: (1) voting and (2) game. Please read the rules of the game in the following. 
After that, you will get details about the voting procedure. 
Rules of the Game 
Three players will take part in the game, i.e., apart from you, there are two other players. All in all, your 
group of three players has an initial endowment of 90 LD. One of the players is provided with an initial 
endowment of 20 LD (“type20” in the following). Another player (“type30“) is provided with an initial 
endowment of 30 LD and another one is provided with an initial endowment of 40 LD (“type40“). Whether 
you are type20, type30, or type40 will be drawn by lot and announced before the voting. 
Your task in the game (which is the same for your teammates in your group) is to decide what amount of 
LD you are willing to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q, to the project can range 
between 0 and 20 LD if you are type20. Your contribution can range between 0 and 30 LD if you are 
type30 and between 0 and 40 LD if you are type40. 
The individual payoff (in LD) for each one of the three players is derived as follows:  
Payoff = (initial endowment of player – contribution of player) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all 
players) 
Assume you are type20, then your payoff (in LD) is: 
Payoff = (20 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players) 
 
That means, if, for example, the other two players contribute a total of 70 LD and you contribute 10 LD to 
the project, then your payoff is  
Payoff = (20 – 10) + 0,6·(70 + 10) = 58 
Whereas, if the other two players contribute a total of 70 LD and you contribute nothing, your payoff is  
Payoff = (20 – 0) + 0,6·(70 + 0) = 62 
If you are type30, your payoff is (in LD): 
Payoff = (30 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players) 
If you are type40, your payoff is (in LD): 
Payoff = (40 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players) 
The game has two stages. In stage 1, you decide which minimum contribution, Qmin, the group shall make. 
The other players in your group state as well which minimum contribution, Qmin, they would like to have 
for the group.  
The minimum of the suggestions, min(Qmin), is set as the minimum contribution of the group. Then in 
stage 2, you decide about your contribution, q, to the project, whereby for every player a lower limit, qmin, 
for the individual contribution is calculated from min(Qmin) according to a specific rule.  
There are three rules to vote from: 
Rule 1 “Equal Contribution“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the minimum contributions, 
qmin, of all players are as equal as possible* so that every player contributes at least one third of the group’s 
minimum contribution, min(Qmin), i.e., qmin = (1/3) · min(Qmin). 
Rule 2 “Equal Payoff“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the payoffs off all players are equal or 
at least adjusted as far as possible*.  
Rule 3 “Proportional Contribution“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the minimum 
contributions, qmin, of all players are proportional to their initial endowment. I.e., the higher the initial 
endowment the higher is the minimum contribution, qmin, to the joint project by the player.  
* Please note that the adjustment is subject to the condition that the minimum contribution of the group to the joint project is 
reached. 
Examples for the rules 1-3 with a minimum contribution of the group min(Qmin) = 45*. 
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 Rule 1 
“Equal Contribution” 
Rule 2 
“Equal Payoff” 
Rule 3 
“Proportional 
Contribution” 
 Lower limit of 
contribution 
Payoff Lower limit of 
contribution 
Payoff Lower limit of 
contribution 
Payoff 
Type20 15 32 5 42 10 37 
Type30 15 42 15 42 15 42 
Type40 15 52 25 42 20 47 
* Assumption: Each player chooses their lower limit as the contribution, i.e. q = qmin. 
 
Please use the simulator to understand the examples. On your screen you will find an Excel file named 
“simulator”. You can enter your desired minimum contribution of the group, min(Qmin), in the 
simulator. For each rule (rule 1 “Equal Contribution”, rule 2 “Equal Payoff”, rule 3 “Proportional 
Contribution”) the individual minimum contributions, qmin, and the corresponding payoffs to each player as 
well as the payoff to the group are calculated. Please note that only the corresponding minimum 
contributions are calculated, i.e. the minimum contribution of the group, min(Qmin), is distributed to the 
players according to the different rules. Of course, you can also contribute more than the calculated 
minimum contribution, but only as long as your contribution does not exceed your initial endowment.  
 
The game consists of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the same game, you remain the same 
type and you interact with the same two participants. In each round, you will be informed about the 
proposals of the minimum contribution (Qmin1 to Qmin3), the contributions (q1 to q3) and the payoffs (payoff1 
to payoff3) of all players in your group as well as the average values (D). 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the payoff of one of the ten rounds in € (3 LD = 1 €). The 
round that will be disbursed is chosen randomly. Therefore, in each round, you should act as if it was 
relevant to disbursement. In the beginning, there will be two trial rounds which are not relevant to 
disbursement. 
 
Voting 
The members of a group decide for themselves which rule will be applied for the distribution of the group’s 
minimum contribution, min(Qmin). The voting is a majority vote [alternative wording for unanimity rule 
voting: the voting is a unanimity rule] (between rule 1 “Equal Contribution”, rule 2 “Equal Payoff” and 
rule 3 “Proportional Contribution”), i.e. if at least two of the [alternative wording for unanimity rule voting: 
if all of the] three group members vote for the same rule, it will be applied. There is a maximum of three 
voting rounds.   
If there is no rule that has received at least two of the three votes after the third voting, the game will be 
played without stage 1, i.e. no minimum contribution is determined and each player just states their 
contribution to the project and the payoffs will be determined as mentioned above. 
 
Illustration 1 shows the course of the experiment in a nutshell. 
Illustration 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 2:
contribution phase
Stage 1: 
minimum stage
Stage 2:
 individual 
contribution stage
Start End
Phase 1: 
collective-choice phase
drawing and 
announcement of 
types
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Control Questions (please answer, use the simulator if necessary) 
1. Assume, the three players have stated 10, 20 and 30 respectively as the proposal for the minimum 
contribution. 
What is the group’s minimum contribution min(Qmin)? 
The group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), is: _______ 
 
2. Assume, the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), to the project is 30. What is your minimum 
contribution and payoff if you have agreed on the following rules, if all the players contribute their 
minimum contribution and you are type20? (Tip: Use the simulator) 
Agreed rule → Rule 1 
“Equal Contribution” 
Rule 2 
“Equal Payoff” 
Rule 3 
“Proportional 
Contribution” 
My minimum contribution 
qmin 
   
My payoff    
 
3. Assume, you could not agree on a rule in your group. Afterwards you make as a type30 a contribution 
of 20 LD. The other two players contribute 0 LD and 10 LD. What is your payoff? 
My payoff is:  ________ 
 
4. We have the same situation as in 3.) and the other players in your group have contributed their whole 
initial endowment to the project. Which of the following contributions gives you the highest payoff as 
a type40? 
(please tick) 
O 0 LD  O 10 LD  O 20 LD  O 40 LD 
 
5. We have the same situation as in 3.) and the other players in your group have contributed their whole 
initial endowment to the project. Which of the following contributions gives the group the highest 
payoff if you are a type40? (please tick) 
O 0 LD  O 10 LD  O 20 LD  O 40 LD 
 
If you have answered all the questions, please give us a sign. We will then check your answers. The game 
will start (with explanations on the screen) when all participants have answered the control questions 
correctly.   
 
Good luck!  
The MaXLab-Team 
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Single-Phase Game 
Please read the instructions carefully and contact us by opening the door or giving a hand signal if you have 
any questions. Please do not talk to each other and do not use any electronic devices such as mobile phones, 
smart phones, or the like throughout the whole experiment. In the experiment you are now taking part in, 
you can earn money depending on your decisions and those of your teammates. Your payoff from the 
experiment is calculated in LaborDollars (LD) and the exchange rate between € and LD is 1:3, i.e., 3 LD 
equals 1 €. 
During the experiment, you make your decisions anonymously. Only the experimenter will know your 
identity and your data will be treated confidentially. 
Rules of the Game 
Three players will take part in the game, i.e., apart from you, there are two other players. All in all, your 
group of three players has an initial endowment of 90 LD. One of the players is provided with an initial 
endowment of 20 LD (“type20” in the following). Another player (“type30“) is provided with an initial 
endowment of 30 LD and another one is provided with an initial endowment of 40 LD (“type40“). Whether 
you are type20, type30, or type40 will be drawn by lot and announced before the voting. 
Your task in the game (which is the same for your teammates in your group) is to decide what amount of 
LD you are willing to contribute to a joint project. Your contribution, q, to the project can range 
between 0 and 20 LD if you are type20. Your contribution can range between 0 and 30 LD if you are 
type30 and between 0 and 40 LD if you are type40. 
The individual payoff (in LD) for each one of the three players is derived as follows:  
Payoff = (initial endowment of player – contribution of player) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all 
players) 
Assume you are type20, then your payoff (in LD) is: 
Payoff = (20 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players) 
That means, if, for example, the other two players contribute a total of 70 LD and you contribute 10 LD to 
the project, then your payoff is  
Payoff = (20 – 10) + 0,6·(70 + 10) = 58 
Whereas, if the other two players contribute a total of 70 LD and you contribute nothing, your payoff is  
Payoff = (20 – 0) + 0,6·(70 + 0) = 62 
If you are type30, your payoff is (in LD): 
Payoff = (30 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players) 
If you are type40, your payoff is (in LD): 
Payoff = (40 – your contribution) + 0.6·(total sum of contributions by all players) 
 
In order to ease you the calculation, you will find an Excel file names “simulator” on your screen. For 
example, you can enter suggestions for your contribution and the contributions of the other group members 
into the simulator. The payoffs to each player as well as the payoff to the group are calculated.  
 
The game consists of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the same game, you remain the same 
type and you interact with the same two participants. In each round, you will be informed about the 
contributions (q1 to q3) and the payoffs (payoff1 to payoff3) of all players in your group as well as the 
average values (D). 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the payoff of one of the ten rounds in € (3 LD = 1 €). The 
round that will be disbursed is chosen randomly. Therefore, in each round, you should act as if it was 
relevant to disbursement. In the beginning, there will be two trial rounds which are not relevant to 
disbursement. 
 
[Alternative paragraph for rule “Equal Contribution”: 
The game has two stages. In stage 1, you decide which minimum contribution, Qmin, the group shall make. 
The other players in your group state as well which minimum contribution, Qmin, they would like to have 
for the group.  
The minimum of the suggestions, min(Qmin), is set as the minimum contribution of the group. Then in 
stage 2, you decide about your contribution, q, to the project, whereby for every player a lower limit, qmin, 
for the individual contribution is calculated from min(Qmin) according to a specific rule.  
The following rule will be applied:  
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Rule “Equal Contribution“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the minimum contributions, qmin, 
of all players are as equal as possible* so that every player contributes at least one third of the group’s 
minimum contribution, min(Qmin), i.e., qmin = (1/3) · min(Qmin). 
 
Examples for the rule “Equal Contribution” with a minimum contribution of the group min(Qmin) = 45*. 
 Rule  
“Equal Contribution” 
 Lower limit of 
contribution 
Payoff 
Type20 15 32 
Type30 15 42 
Type40 15 52 
* Assumption: Each player chooses their lower limit as the contribution, i.e. q = qmin. 
 
[Alternative paragraph for rule “Equal Payoff”:  
The game has two stages. In stage 1, you decide which minimum contribution, Qmin, the group shall make. 
The other players in your group state as well which minimum contribution, Qmin, they would like to have 
for the group.  
The minimum of the suggestions, min(Qmin), is set as the minimum contribution of the group. Then in 
stage 2, you decide about your contribution, q, to the project, whereby for every player a lower limit, qmin, 
for the individual contribution is calculated from min(Qmin) according to a specific rule.  
The following rule will be applied:  
 
Rule “Equal Payoff“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the payoffs off all players are equal or at 
least adjusted as far as possible∗*. ] 
 
Examples for the rule “Equal Payoff” with a minimum contribution of the group min(Qmin) = 45*. 
 Rule 
“Equal Payoff” 
 Lower limit of 
contribution 
Payoff 
Type20 5 42 
Type30 15 42 
Type40 25 42 
* Assumption: Each player chooses their lower limit as the contribution, i.e., q = qmin.] 
 
[Alternative paragraph for rule “Proportional Contributions”:  
The game has two stages. In stage 1, you decide which minimum contribution, Qmin, the group shall make. 
The other players in your group state as well which minimum contribution, Qmin, they would like to have 
for the group.  
The minimum of the suggestions, min(Qmin), is set as the minimum contribution of the group. Then in 
stage 2, you decide about your contribution, q, to the project, whereby for every player a lower limit, qmin, 
for the individual contribution is calculated from min(Qmin) according to a specific rule.  
The following rule will be applied:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
∗Please note that the adjustment is subject to the condition that the minimum contribution of the group to the joint project is 
reached. 
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Rule “Proportional Contribution“: qmin is determined from min(Qmin) so that the minimum 
contributions, qmin, of all players are proportional to their initial endowment. I.e., the higher the initial 
endowment the higher is the minimum contribution, qmin, to the joint project by the player.] 
Examples for the rule “Proportional Contribution” with a minimum contribution of the group min(Qmin) = 
45*. 
 Rule 
“Proportional 
Contribution” 
 Lower limit of 
contribution 
Payoff 
Type20 10 37 
Type30 15 42 
Type40 20 47 
* Assumption: Each player chooses their lower limit as the contribution, i.e., q = qmin.] 
 
 
Please use the simulator to understand the examples. On your screen you will find an Excel file named 
“simulator”. You can enter your desired minimum contribution of the group, min(Qmin), in the 
simulator. For the rule “Equal Contribution” [alternative wording for equal payoff (eqpay) rule: “Equal 
Payoff”] [alternative wording for the proportional contribution (propcont) rule: “Proportional 
Contribution”] the individual minimum contributions, qmin, and the corresponding payoffs to each player as 
well as the payoff to the group are calculated. Please note that only the corresponding minimum 
contributions are calculated, i.e. the minimum contribution of the group, min(Qmin), is distributed to the 
players according to the different rules. Of course, you can also contribute more than the calculated 
minimum contribution, but only as long as your contribution does not exceed your initial endowment.  
 
The game consists of ten separate rounds, in which you always play the same game, you remain the same 
type and you interact with the same two participants. In each round, you will be informed about the 
proposals of the minimum contribution (Qmin1 to Qmin3), the contributions (q1 to q3) and the payoffs (payoff1 
to payoff3) of all players in your group as well as the average values (D). 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the payoff of one of the ten rounds in € (3 LD = 1 €). The 
round that will be disbursed is chosen randomly. Therefore, in each round, you should act as if it was 
relevant to disbursement. In the beginning, there will be two trial rounds which are not relevant to 
disbursement. 
 
Control Questions (please answer, use the simulator if necessary) 
 
[Additional questions for rule: “Equal Contribution”: 
 
1. Assume, the three players have stated 10, 20 and 30 respectively as the proposal for the minimum 
contribution. 
What is the group’s minimum contribution min(Qmin)? 
The group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), is: _______ 
2. Assume, the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), to the project is 30. What is your minimum 
contribution and payoff in the “Equal Contribution” rule, if all the players contribute their minimum 
contribution and you are type20? (Tip: Use the simulator) 
 Rule  
“Equal Contribution” 
My minimum contribution 
qmin 
 
My payoff  
] 
[Additional questions for rule “Equal Payoff”: 
1. Assume, the three players have stated 10, 20 and 30 respectively as the proposal for the minimum 
contribution. 
What is the group’s minimum contribution min(Qmin)? 
The group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), is: _______ 
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2. Assume, the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), to the project is 30. What is your minimum 
contribution and payoff in the “Equal Payoffs” rule, if all the players contribute their minimum 
contribution and you are type20? (Tip: Use the simulator) 
 Rule  
“Equal Payoffs” 
My minimum contribution 
qmin 
 
My payoff  
] 
[Additional question for rule “Proportional Contribution”: 
1. Assume, the three players have stated 10, 20 and 30 respectively as the proposal for the minimum 
contribution. 
What is the group’s minimum contribution min(Qmin)? 
The group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), is: _______ 
2. Assume, the group’s minimum contribution, min(Qmin), to the project is 30. What is your minimum 
contribution and payoff in the “Proportional Contributions” rule, if all the players contribute their 
minimum contribution and you are type20? (Tip: Use the simulator) 
 Rule  
“Proportional 
Contributions” 
My minimum contribution 
qmin 
 
My payoff  
] 
1. Assume that your contribution as Type40 to the joint project is 20 LD. The contributions of the two 
other group members are 0 and 10 LD. What is your payoff? 
My payoff is ________________ 
2. Assume that your contribution as a Type20 to the joint project is 0 LD. The contributions of the two 
other group members are 10 and 20 LD. What is your payoff? 
My payoff is ________________ 
3. Assume all the other players in your group have contributed their whole initial endowment to the 
project. Which of the following contributions gives you the highest payoff as a type40? 
(please tick) 
O 0 LD  O 10 LD  O 20 LD  O 40 LD 
 
4. Assume all the other players in your group have contributed their whole initial endowment to the 
project. Which of the following contributions gives the group the highest payoff if you are a type40? 
(please tick) 
O 0 LD  O 10 LD  O 20 LD  O 40 LD 
 
If you have answered all the questions, please give us a sign. We will then check your answers. The game 
will start (with explanations on the screen) when all participants have answered the control questions 
correctly.   
 
Good luck!  
The MaXLab-Team 
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Appendix F: Screenshots 
Figure F.1: Screenshot of the Collective-Choice Phase of the Multi-Phase-Game 
(majority voting) 
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Figure F.2: Screenshot of the Contribution Phase of the Multi-Phase-Game (eqcont) 
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Figure F.3: Screenshot of the Simulator (for 𝑸𝒎𝒊𝒏  =  𝟒𝟓, above: majority voting, below: propcont) 
 
 
 
 
 
Please fill in fields marked in YELLOW
0 Between 0 und 90 (a multiple of 3)
Minimum Contribution, qmin Payoff in LD Minimum Contribution, qmin Payoff in LD Minimum Contribution, qmin Payoff in LD Contribution, q Payoff in LD
Type20 0.0 20.0 Type20 0.0 20.0 Type20 0.0 20.0 Type20 0 20.0
Type30 0.0 30.0 Type30 0.0 30.0 Type30 0.0 30.0 Type30 0 30.0
Type40 0.0 40.0 Type40 0.0 40.0 Type40 0.0 40.0 Type40 0 40.0
90.0 90.0 90.0 90.0
These are the individual minimum contribution levels. You can contribute more, but only as long as your contribution does not exceed your initial endowment. 
Si
m
ul
at
or Rule 1 "Equal Contribution" Rule  3 "Proportional Contribution" Without step 1
Suggested minimum group contribution level, min(Qmin):
Payoff to the whole group: Payoff to the whole group: Payoff to the whole group:
Rule  2 "Equal Payoff"
Payoff to the whole group:
Please fill in fields marked in YELLOW
0 Between 0 und 90 (a multiple of 3)
Minimum Contribution, qmin Payoff in LD
Type20 0.0 20.0
Type30 0.0 30.0
Type40 0.0 40.0
90.0
These are the individual minimum contribution levels. You can contribute more, but only as long as your contribution does not exceed your initial endowment. 
Si
m
ul
at
or Rule  "Proportional Contribution"
Suggested minimum group contribution level, min(Qmin):
Payoff to the whole group:
